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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2(a)3(2)(j) inasmuch as this case was transferred to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
First Issue
Whether the evidence presented to the trial court was sufficient to establish that it
was Ina C. Holman's intent to amend her trust with the Update to Trust of Ina C. Holman
dated February 5, 2001?
The standard of review is the clearly erroneous standard articulated in rule 52(a) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, rule 52(a) provides that "[findings of
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses." UTAH R. Civ. P. 52(a). According to the Utah Supreme
Court, rule 52(a)'s clearly erroneous standard is applied in the following manner:
[T]he content of Rule 52(a)'s "clearly erroneous" standard, imported from the
federal rule, requires that if the findings ... are against the clear weight of the
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made, thefindings... will be set aside.
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). See also In re Z.D. 147 P.3d 401, 405406 (Utah 2006).
Second Issue
Whether the trial court acted within its discretion by admitting into evidence the
original and duplicate Updates to Trust of Ina C. Holman?
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The standard of review is abuse of discretion. See Vigil v. Div of Child & Family
Servs., 107 P.3d 716, 718 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). This Court explained, 'Trial courts are
afforded broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence; thus we will not
disturb a trial court's ruling whether to admit or exclude evidence absent an abuse of
discretion." Vigil, 107 P.3d at 718. In Gorostieta v. Parkinson, the Utah Supreme Court
explained that "[t]he admissibility of an item of evidence is a legal question. However,
the trial court has a great deal of discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude
evidence, and its ruling will not be overturned unless there is an abuse of discretion." 17
P.3d 1110, 1114 (Utah 2000) (internal quotations omitted). See also State v. Casias, 772
P.2d 975, 977 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("In the absence of an abuse of discretion, the trial
court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed.")
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Rules:
UTAH

R. A P P . P. 24(a)(9)

(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated ... (a)(9) An argument. The
argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to
the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved
in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record
relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence
that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees
incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for
such an award.
U T A H R. Civ. P.

52(a)

In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon,
and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and
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conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for
findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based
on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses ....
UTAH R . E V I D . 1003

A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine
question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances
it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case originally came before the trial court on the Petition for Construction of
Trust Documents of Central Bank as trustee of the Ina C. Holman Family Trust ("Trust").
R. 43. The petition sought the construction of documents potentially affecting trust
administration, including an Update to Trust of Ina C. Holman, dated February 5, 2001
("Update to Trust"), because a dispute had arisen among the children of Ina Holman
("Ina") concerning the interpretation, effect, and validity of the documents. R. 42. By its
language, the Update to Trust purported to remove Robert Holman ("Robert"), Ina's son,
from the Trust as both a beneficiary and a successor co-trustee on account of real estate,
loans, and money Ina distributed to Robert in excess of his share of the estate. R. 14,
Exhibits 2 & 9.
Course of Proceedings
Each of Ina's then-living children responded to the petition. R. 67, 70, & 73. The
trial court set a one day evidentiary hearing for November 14, 2005. R. 83. Prior to the
evidentiary hearing, two motions in limine were filed by Phyllis Hall ("Phyllis"), R. 253
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& 280, and one by Kathleen Robinson ("Kathy"), Jenevieve Holman ("Jenny"), and the
Spencer Family (R. Henry Spencer, Cindy Riley, Pam Gondola, Jana Hay, Sue Frampton,
Beth Jeppson, John Spencer, Edith Dunn, Andrew Spencer, Heather Spencer, and Allison
Mack, individually the eleven children of Marion Spencer, Ina's deceased daughter), R.
305. On November 14, 2005, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing in which it
received testimony from David McBeth, Lyle Gertsch, Kathy, Phyllis, Robert, Jenny, and
Sue Frampton. R. 525, Official Certified Transcript ("Trans."), 2-4. Following the
evidentiary hearing, Kathy, Jenny, and the Spencer Family filed with the trial court a
Motion to Substitute Original Documents for Photocopies Received into Evidence as
Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 9. R. 338. The parties provided the trial court with post-trial
memoranda in lieu of closing arguments. R. 351, 458, & 464.
Disposition in Court Below
On December 23, 2005, the trial court filed a Memorandum Decision stating the
trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. R. 479. The trial court's
Memorandum Decision addressed the issues raised at the evidentiary hearing by the
parties, namely the construction and enforceability of the Update to Trust as well whether
the Spencer Family was a beneficiary of the Trust. R. 472, 476. With regards to the
construction and enforceability of the Update to Trust, the trial court determined that the
Update to Trust was valid and that it was Ina's intent to create the Update to Trust. R.
472-476. Specifically, the trial court determined that the Update to Trust was consistent
with communications between Robert and Ina concerning the forgiveness of a debt owed
by Robert to Ina in exchange for Robert trading his interest in the Trust. R. 474-475.
9

Additionally, the trial court determined that Ina executed the Update to Trust without
being unduly influenced by Kathy and that Ina had the requisite capacity to execute the
Update to Trust. R. 473-474. The trial court also determined that the Spencer Family was
a beneficiary of the Trust based upon the clear language of the Trust and the pleadings of
the parties. R. 469-472. The trial court also admitted into evidence the original Updates
without admitting into evidence the affidavits of Kathy and Jenny that accompanied
them. R. 477. Counsel for Central Bank subsequently prepared a Judgment which the trial
court signed on March 16, 2006. R. 512.
Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for Review
On July 27, 1990, Ina created the Trust. See Exhibit 1. At the time the trust was
created, Ina had four living children: Kathy, Jenny, Phyllis, and Robert. See Exhibit 1, p.
2. The Trust was a revocable trust which provided for Ina's maintenance during her life,
and then distributed the trust estate to her children upon Ina's death. See Exhibit 1, p. 2 4. Pursuant to the Trust document, Ina's children were beneficiaries and successor cotrustees. See Exhibit 1, p. 5.
Before and after the creation of the Trust, Robert received real estate, loans, and
money from Ina which were equal to or in excess of Robert's share of Ina's estate. See
Exhibit 2, 9 & 15. Among other things, Ina loaned to Robert $80,000. Trans. 181:17-21.
Robert failed to make any payments on the loan, and the principal amount and interest
eventually grew to more than $120,000. Trans. 182:6-16. Ina eventually instructed an
attorney to contact Robert to foreclose on a trust deed securing the debt in October 1994.
See Exhibit 13.
10

To resolve the issues related to the debt he owed Ina, Robert discussed with Ina his
participation in the Trust. Trans. 184:20-185:13. Around the time of the foreclosure,
Robert sent a letter to Ina. See Exhibit 15, Trans. 187:17-23. In the letter, Robert outlines
a plan in which he would "trade [his] interest in the estate for the promissory note,"
which he calculated were nearly equivalent. See Exhibit 15 ff 2, 5; see also Trans.
189:17-190:3. On October 21, 1994, Robert sent to his mother a letter outlining an
agreement by which Robert would deliver to Ina a deed for certain property wiih the
understanding that Ina would then forgive his debt and remove Robert from any wills or
trusts then made or to be made. See Exhibit 16, Trans. 195:9-196:14.
In January 2001, Ina was hospitalized after a fall. Trans. 98:9-99:5. After leaving
the hospital, Ina lived with Jenny for ten to fourteen days. Trans. 258:19-22, 259:12-13.
Ina then moved to Midway to live with Kathy. Trans. 101:1-2.
During January and February 2001, Kathy and Ina spoke often. Trans. 280:7-11.
Ina often expressed to Kathy concern about the condition of her family and the Trust.
Trans. 280:10-11. Ina was concerned that the Trust was unevenly distributed because of
distributions she had provided to Robert. Trans. 120:6-15, 120:23-122:22. Consequently,
Ina decided to amend her trust to remove Robert. Trans. See Exhibits 2, 2A, 9 & 9A, f 3.
With the assistance of Kathy, the Update to Trust was prepared. See Exhibits 2, 2 A, 9, &
9A; Trans. 280:12-16. The Update to Trust provided, in part, the following:
Since my son, Robert J. Holman, has previously received real estate, loans and
money from me equal to or in excess of his share of my estate, his name is to be
removed from my previously written trust, and he is to be excluded from sharing
in the proceeds of any of my estate after my death.
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Exhibits 2, 2A, 9, & 9A, ^j 3. Two original I Jpdates to Trust were prepared for Ina's
s i gna tu re I r ai i s 5 9:1 < 1 6 0:2
On February 5, 2001, L\!c(i^r:-.

-

was staying. Trans. 62:7-1 ' M? ( iertsch spoke w uli Ina and witnessed her sign the
Updates to 1 rust. I;.u... i._ „ - o ; \ i . .wi s- iertsch said that Ina did not appear confused,
was ver\ COIHMVIII >

' •

,

•-• •

ilmn .tiiln nine In.i signed die

I Jpdates to Trust. Trans. 65:5-15. At the time the Update to "I rust was signed, ina «, ould
carry on a conversation, knew who her children were, and was aware of what property

Robert's relationship with Ina was strained in 2000 and 200 J

?

• -^

"""••• : > -

22. Robert said that during that time period he did not talk to his mother much, if at all.
Tfiiii1. P " ltt- V Ruin rl learned ul I (ukt.e In l u r a ai ilic spring oi J-.H. .. n a n s . .o*> : 23, and received a copy in April 2002, frans. 170:1-13.
In 2002, Ina was declared incapacitated. See Exhibits 3 & 4. The incapacitation
•*':;*

*

• *

.

;

..;

M ;

In August 2002, Ina's children prepared an aaree? * -

.

/

14..

l

.*' •-

property would be sold off. See Exhibit 5. Even though Ina had removed Robert as a co!niii1«\ ainl ,i beneficial \ lie nancd I lie agreement as a trustee. ;->cc Exhibit 5. While he
and his sisters were aware that Robert had p r n inush hirn n iimsnl i, i mi usiei ihey
continued to attempt to work as a family and to avoid discord. Trans. 9". i 7-21, , ^ - 1 v,
-.-7. . ;. ) . .; }i\ s e a t i n g Hie August 2002 agreement Ina's children were
inniH h) iiLMi.e

• <»••">•• - ..-

/ eef .ilmn
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However, on account of their discomfort with it, Kathy and Jenny repudiated the
agreement immediately after signing it. 116:11-117:4, 125:15-126:8.
On March 31, 2005, Ina passed away. R. 42, % 4.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In response to Robert's Brief of Appellant, Kathy, Jenny, and the Spencer Family
(collectively, "the Appellees") assert that Robert failed to marshal evidence as required
by rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Instead of presenting in
comprehensive and fastidious order every scrap of competent evidence introduced at the
hearing which supports the trial court's findings concerning Ina's intent to amend the
Trust and the evidence supporting the trial court's decision to admit the Update to Trust,
Robert has simply presented those facts that militate against the trial court's findings.
Given Robert's failure to marshal evidence as required by rule 24(a)(9), this Court should
uphold the trial court's findings of fact concerning Ina's intent to amend her trust and
find that the trial court acted within its discretion to admit the documents amending Ina's
trust into evidence.
The Appellees further argue that the trial court's finding of fact that Ina intended
to amend her trust is supported by the clear weight of the evidence. Robert attempts to
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's finding of intent by
arguing that the trial court applied the wrong evidentiary standard. However, given that
the proper evidentiary standard was included in the parties' pleadings and that the court
never stated that it was applying the wrong evidentiary standard, this Court should
assume that the trial court applied the proper evidentiary standard of clear and convincing
13

evidence. Significantly, the trial court's findings of fact are supported by the clear weiuhi
(

•

c .*-i uu:hM:-.iraiLU n. i;u uuii^Mii. s Memorandum Decision, in which

the bases for the trial court's finding of intei it on tl le pai t of lit la to ai nei id 1 lei I:i: i ist ar i
articulated and well supported.
Finally, the trial court acted reasonably and within its broad discretion when it
admitted into ev idence the cii lplicate ai id Driginal I Jpdates to I i i ist at the time of tl ic
hearing and following the close of evidence, respectively. Robert challenges the li i,il
court's admission of the duplicate I Jpdates lo Trust as nmninL> contran u> rule '()().? of
the T Jtah R i lies of Ev idence I lowev ei the] .

^opiCh i ;; . . pdatc> iu Irust qtu :\ as

duplicates under rule 1003, and, therefore, are admi^ ; !

* '

originals. The determination that the duplicates are admissible is supported by the trial
:'••': •..

> i-

. *. u - ; \-»u a concemiii j, ;.' K « i • ithcn i ic\ i\ of the

original Updates to Irusl. furthermore, luilouim1 *!

-•* '

*i

tin1 d il

court acted reasonably and within its discretion when it admitted into evidence the
oiigiu.il I lpd<iU;'. lui 11 ml u illiunil reopening the hearing un' iunher testimony. By that
time, the trial court had already received extern c ir«diniuin MHieemim' IIIR; 1 ipdnte^ n»
Trust, and, for that reason, additional testimony was not required.

I.

' rhe Court of Appeals Should AITnriiii iln11 I'liiil n 'oini s JIHIJJIIM'III HiTuuse
Appellant Robert Holman Failed to Maiisliul Iv i idtim i
In his Brief of Appellant. Robert Holman f ; Roberf} c*>mnletel\ failed to marshal

i" -!'^'\

--i:

..

-:;. v ; ;.ts oi Appellate iYoLeduiL. = ur that reason, the Coi irt
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of Appeals should affirm the trial court's judgment and refuse to disturb the trial court's
findings of fact.
Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure addresses, in part, the content
required in an appellant's brief. It requires that "[a] party challenging a fact finding must
first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." UTAH R. APP. P.
24(a)(9). The Utah Supreme Court explained that to meet the rule 24(a)(9) requirement,
"parties protesting findings of fact must marshal all the evidence in support of the finding
and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even
when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." United Park City Mines
Co. v. Stitching Mayflower Ml Fonds, 140 P.3d 1200, 1206 (Utah 2006) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
In West Valley City v. Hoskins, this Court explained that marshaling requires the
following:
[T]he challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence,
the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw
must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting
upon the evidence is clearly erroneous.
51 P.3d 52, 55 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis in original) (quoting West Valley City v.
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). As this Court explained,
the duty of an appellant to marshal the evidence is a "critical requirement of appellate
advocacy." West Valley City, 51 P.3d at 54.
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1 his Court also explained that a failure to marshal evidence as required by r ule

294 (Utah.Ct. APP ' w ^ » In Houditon, the Court e>- -

• Whm

.

•••

marshal the e\idence. v\e need not consider the challenge to the sufficiency of the
fine.mp

... A I .;.o., ,1/iu; ^ yk Assocs., Inc. v. Images & Attitude, Inc., 941 P.2d 636,

642 (Utah u . *.

" ' '

" '

- ill uphold flu, trial anul"-, liiidin^sol lad il IL \)lw\\

challenging the Iindings fails to appropriately marshal all the evidence."); Saunders v.
Sharp "---i _u >_ -. •* J »
!

. -•

•

*'

A

r r 1990) (Burden of marshaling evidence "is a

*

marshaling the

evidence, we re i use to consider the merits of challenges iu me iindings and accept I In
findings as valid."). The Utah Supreme Court explained that "[i]f an appellant argues that

appellee; rather, the appellee may prove that the appellant did nut nu-i * u; • m -i h ; .
'burden by presenting a 'scintilla' of evidence supporting the district enun's finding."
. .-. »• « !/. Supply, Inc. i;i" f ) adan

/>- • •
Mfg. Corp., 54 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2002)).

The case of Par duhn v. Bennett provides an excellent example of the
uHisafiienees stemming from

hulim.1 lo niai.sliul St\ I 11 P,:ui I 9 \ :>U 4 o()4 (1 'tali

2005). InParduhn, two individuals entered into a partnership agreemei it (" Agreement")
for the purpose of owning-and operating a gas station. Id. at 498. The Agreement
:<0 • ^.. pi;.'. iMv-n .,.ai iiU«,>^i ror continuing the partnership in the event a
partner die f /. - ' *

*

^-

- .

i

**' <:• .• ;
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contemplated that each partner would purchase a life insurance policy designating the
other as beneficiary. Upon the death of one of the partners, the surviving partner would
use the proceeds from the insurance policy to purchase the deceased partner's interest in
the partnership from the deceased partner's heirs." Id.
In 1997, the partners sold the gas stations comprising their business. Id. That same
year, one of the partners passed away ("decedent"). Id. The decedent's heirs claimed the
life insurance proceeds while the surviving partner claimed that he was entitled to the
policy proceeds. Id. at 499. The trial court ultimately awarded the life insurance proceeds
to the decedent's heirs. Id. It held that the decedent intended his heirs, and not his
surviving partner, to receive the proceeds. Id. at 499-500.
The surviving partner challenged the trial court's subsidiary findings of fact
related to the trial court's ultimate finding of fact concerning the decedent's intent. See id.
at 502-03. Among other things, the surviving partner asserted that the trial court
erroneously found that the partners sold their partnership and its assets, and that the
partners treated the partnership casually. Id. at 503.
In addressing the surviving partner's challenge of the trial court's findings of fact
related to the decedent's intent, the Utah Supreme Court explained, "To successfully
challenge that ultimate finding [of intent], [the surviving partner] should have marshaled
all of the remaining evidence supporting it and then demonstrated why that evidence 4is
legally insufficient to support it even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the
court below.'" Id. at 504 (quoting Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 1195 (Utah 2004)).
The Utah Supreme Court then continued by explaining that the surviving partner had not
17

marshaled the evidence. Parduhn, 112 P.3d at 504. The surviving partner simply had
pro\ aicu d\\ aduciidujii iw iii i hue! A.ih "Miost o! th*. u^cuments on which the district
court relied in iiiakim» lis lindni" nt inlnn

milium i.>pl,iimn

\\\\\ ilm ni'.tl i nil

rnnl

in interpreting the evidence as it did." Id.
1 he I ) tali Supreme Court explained that the surviving partner's attempt fell far
shorl i*l Ihc miu'slulni!.' H e\ idrnee lupmed h I 'liili appellate aniils Li ll explained:
To appropriately marshal evidence, parties must provide a precisely focused
summary of all the evidence supporting the findings they challenge. This
summary must correlate all particular items of evidence with tin challenged
findings and then convince us that the trial court erred in the assessment of that
evidence to its findings. Indeed parties challenging factual finding rrmct f} jjiy
embrace the adversary's position and play devil's advocate.
Rather than meeting this high burden, [the surviving partner! simply presents
those facts that militate against the district court's finding of intent—a strategy we
have previously found to be insufficient.
hi. at 504 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). As a consequence of the
• . - "
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of intent, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the surviving partner's arguments iv! if, -' '
the findings of fact. .A /.
- ',,..•'.•'.. . . l . , .'.AS l a l l c d U ,,,ar:,llui a n v

evidence as required by rule 24(a )(VJ K Robert has asserted two r- -ii^

*r.

*lrst

is a challenge to the sufficiency of the trial court's factual findings that Ina Holman
:•

T

.

..,.;.....!.

• • . , Uiv. Update to

the 1 rust oflna C. Holman dated = • - ; - • • "
Brief, 4. The second is that the trial court erred by receiving into evidence the originals
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and duplicates of the Update to Trust because Robert disputes their authenticity.
Appellant's Brief, 5.
In laying out the facts that allegedly support the two issues identified in his appeal,
Robert failed to identify the facts upon which the trial court relied to determine that Ina
intended to amend her trust and that the Update to Trust was authentic. Instead, Robert
simply identified for the appellate court the same arguments and facts previously
identified in his pleadings and at the time of the hearing concerning alleged
inconsistencies in the actions of Kathleen Robinson ("Kathy") following Ina's execution
of the Update to Trust.
Robert marshaled none of the evidence identified in the trial court's Memorandum
Decision in support of the trial court's finding that it was Ina's intent to amend her trust.
For example, Robert makes no mention of the nearly $124,000.00 he owed to his mother
that was discussed in a 1994 letter to his mother, see Exhibit 15 ^f 15, and in his testimony
at the time of the hearing, see Trans. 182:6-16. In its Memorandum Decision, the trial
court discussed extensively the offers made by Robert in his 1994 letter to exchange his
interest in Ina's trust for the forgiveness by Ina of his debt. See R. 475; Trans. 189:17—
190:3. Robert also fails to marshal for this Court a subsequent letter entered into evidence
and discussed by the trial court in its Memorandum Decision in which Robert more
specifically outlined his request for forgiveness of the debt owed by him to Ina in
exchange for his removal from Ina's trust. See R. 474; Exhibit 16; Trans. 195:9-196:14.
Robert also failed to discuss the actual language of Ina's amendment, also relied
upon by the trial court, which expressly states Ina's reasons for amending the Trust. See
19

R. 474; Exhibits 2, 2A, 9, & 9A, ^ 3. Specifically, the Update ' . Trust provides ilu:
follo\ v i rig:
Since my son, Robert J. Holman, has previously received real estate, loans and
money from me equal to or in excess of his share of my estate, his name is to be
removed from my previously written trust, and he is to be excluded from sharing
in the proceeds of any of my estate after my death.
See Exhibits 2, 2A, 9, & 9A, 1] 3.
The evidence presented by Robert to this Court u; hi** buef does not describe the
testir..

.:;.*<.<. ic:i^;.. t i - puhiu notary vuu> w itnessed Ina's execution of the two

original update^ to Inr;* -
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carried on a good conversation, with him at the time of the execution. See Trans. 62:7-11,
OJ.:^J.
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T r a n s 1 I ^-o-l S. ."" i i ^ - 2 7 2 : 2 2 . 1 lowever, as R o b e r t testified, n w o u l d h a v e been
d - n k . u a i^i i w . - v ^ ^.i^.v-.v in,> m o i h u s capacity at the time she signed the Update to
' fn ist because hi; "\ i elatic )i is"! rii i "< \ it! i Ti ta... \ \ ra, ;, strained in 2000 and 2001 a i i i 1 le talked \ ei y
little with her. if ai .<li h ; m s ! ""W>-y, 15-22.
In I n . i)n^.i. iw;i^ii i u u n a i extensively on agreements and actions following Ihr
Update hi fni'il iiiiii "»,\ liioli knlln .mini l e n n i n r I l o l n u m

ICIIIIN

i 1 rcatciJ Kobcn as a co-

trustee and/or beneficiary of the 'rrust. However, Robert provided this Court with none of
K a t h y ' s testimony m which she explained that the purpose of her actions following Ina's
execution I iT fl .
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family members and to avoid discord in the fauin \,
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testimony that he and his sisters were really trying to figure out a way to manage things
and get along, Trans. 201:24-202:4, 214:1-7.
Given his failure to marshal, and the fact that the above evidence comprises much
more than a "scintilla" of evidence in support of the trial court's decision, this Court
should uphold the trial court's findings of fact concerning Ina's intent to amend the Trust
and concerning the authenticity of the Update to Trust.
II.

Trial Court's Findings of Fact Concerning Ina Holman's Intent to Modify the
Trust Are Supported by Clear and Convincing Evidence.
The trial court's findings that the Update to Trust implemented Ina's intent are not

against the clear weight of the evidence presented to the trial court at the hearing. In his
brief, Robert argues that the trial court applied the wrong evidentiary standard in finding
that the Update to Trust reflected Ina's intent. Specifically, Robert argued that the trial
court applied a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than a clear and convincing
evidence standard in finding that it was Ina's intent to amend her trust. In support of this
argument, Robert asserts that the trial court must have applied the preponderance of the
evidence standard for the following reasons: 1) the trial court did not expressly state the
evidentiary standard that it applied, and 2) the trial court did not expressly address in its
Memorandum Decision Kathy's actions following the execution of the Update to Trust.
However, the following demonstrates that in spite of Robert's attempts to frame
this issue as a question of whether the trial court applied the proper evidentiary standard,
he is really challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's factual
findings, and, as such, the trial court's factual findings should not be overturned unless
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they are against the clear weight of the c\ idence in the record. Furthermore, in the
absence of any express statemer.i i- \m. .• uii u'dn nuii it applied a specific evidentiary

standard. With regards to Robert's assertion that the trial court's findings are insufficient
given, that they do not specifically address certain actions taken by Kathy, the trial court
nie1 ills bunion lb piv VHIIIIJJ .nilin nil! <lol.nl in ih. I slcnioraiidun] Decision to make the
basis of its decision clear. Significantly, the trial court's Memorandum,,, Decision clearly
illustrates that its findings concerning Ina's intent were supported by the weight of the
e\ idence. Each of the abo v e issues is addressed ,n him
Robert Holman's Appeal Challenges the Trial Court's Factui i f Findii igs

A.

and not the Evidentiary Standard Employed by the Court.
This Court should not overturn, the trial court's finding that it was Ina's in ton i u>
inndih 1KM 11"IIsI In e\i Indt Kuhul bcumsc il is inp|>mltd l>\ llir tlcai neigliioi the
evidence. See UTAH R. Civ. P. 52(a). Robert presents his first issue on appeal to this •
Court as a failure on the part of the trial court to apply the correct evidentiary standard.
See Apf)c/liu(l 'v Rnv/, -1 Speci'lii. nlh in dc-,.Li iliiiij his hr.l issue, Robert states the
following: "Whether the Trial Court Erred in Appkim.' *m kipr^rer Evidentiar Si; i .
in Determining Whether the Purported Amendment was Indeed Part of Grantor's Trust "
:: , •*. .

v

'• .IN>V il-
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preponderance of the evidence standard" because the triai
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proper consideration to provided testimony showing inconsistencies between [Kathy's]
• -.,;. ; ...v.u;u.. ..iv. . uncnument and her prior actioi is. ni.
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However, Robert's suggestion that the trial court applied the wrong standard is in
reality an attempt to attack the sufficiency of the trial court's factual findings. Robert
explained that the burden of proof concerning Ina's intent to modify her trust was not
preponderance of the evidence, but clear and convincing evidence. See id. at 16. He then
states, "Unfortunately, the Trial Court does not state in its Memorandum Decision or
elsewhere the standard of proof it employed. An examination of the Decision and the
Transcript strongly suggest that it applied the lower preponderance standard." Id. at 1617. In other words, Robert is arguing that while the trial court at no point states that it is
applying the wrong evidentiary standard, it must have applied the preponderance of the
evidence standard because the evidence does not support the trial court's findings of fact.
The fact that Robert is attempting to present a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence argument to this Court as a failure of the trial court to apply the proper
evidentiary standard is best illustrated by Robert's last paragraph in section I of his
argument. See Appellant's Brief, 20. Robert concludes by asserting the following:
Although this Court typically does not question the weight and credibility to be
given to evidence, it needs to ensure that the trial court applies the proper
evidentiary standard. The fact that the Trial Court failed to even mention any of
the above inconsistencies in reaching its decision suggests that it failed to even
consider them. This infers that the Trial Court applied the lower preponderance of
the evidence standard.
Id. Given that Robert's appeal concerning Ina's intent to modify her trust is really a
challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the trial court based its decision,
this Court should review the trial court's factual findings pursuant to rule 52(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Perhaps one of the most compelling arguments that the rule 52(a) clearly
erroneous standard should be applied to this case is Robert's own assertion that it applies.
Specifically, Robert told this Court that in determining "whether the trial court erred in
applying an improper evidentiary standard in determining whether the purported
amendment was indeed part of grantor's trust," that the appropriate "appellate standard of
review ... is the 'clearly erroneous' standard." See Appellant's Brief, 4-5. Given that
Robert is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's factual
findings, the Court should affirm the trial court because its findings of fact are not against
the clear weight of the evidence in the record.
B.

The Trial Court's Finding of Intent on the Part oflna Holman to Modify
Her Trust Is Supported by Clear and Convincing Evidence.

While Robert suggests that Kathy's behavior following the creation of the Update
to Trust does not support a finding of intent to amend the Trust on the part oflna, the trial
court was presented clear and convincing evidence supporting Ina's intent.
The standard for determining the sufficiency of factual findings by a trial court is
set out in rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It provides, in part, the following:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon ....
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
UTAH

R. Civ. P. 52(a).
The Utah Supreme Court explained in State v. Walker, shortly after Utah adopted

rule 52, how rule 52(a)'s clearly erroneous standard is applied in practice:
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[T]he content of Rule 52(a)5s "clearly erroneous" standard, imported from the
federal rule, requires that if the findings ... are against the clear weight of the
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made, the findings ... will be set aside.
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its articulation of
the clearly erroneous standard as explained in Walker in the matter of In re Z.D. See 147
P.3d 401, 405-406 (Utah 2006) ("We provided sound guidance to appellate courts
regarding the scope of their authority to review factual findings under the clearly
erroneous standard of rule 52(a) in State v. Walker ....").
The Utah Supreme Court also shed additional light on how to apply the clearly
erroneous standard in its decision in In re Z.D. See 147 P.3d at 406. For example, the
Supreme Court explained that when an appellate court is reviewing the sufficiency of
evidence, it is unrealistic to expect the appellate court to do so without weighing the
evidence. See id. The Court continued by explaining that u[t]he appellate court must,
however, go about weighing the evidence with one eye on the scales and the other fixed
firmly on its duty of deference to findings of fact." Id. With one eye firmly fixed on its
deference to the trial court, the appellate court "may only disturb findings that offend the
'clear weight' of the evidence." Id. Significantly, "[a]n appellate court must be capable of
discriminating between discomfort over a trial court's findings of fact—which it must
tolerate—and those that require the court's intercession. It must forbear the 'close call.'"
Id}

1

The Utah Supreme Court also quoted Judge Richard Posner's decision in Carr v. Allison
Gas Turbine Div. Gen. Motors to illustrate the "practical meaning" of rule 52(a). See In
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The Utah Supreme Court explained two additional principles relating to the
application of rule 52(a) to this case: (1) the required review of the record in determining
whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, and (2) the relationship of a heightened
standard of proof as part of the clearly erroneous review. In re Z.D., 147 P.3d at 406-07.
First, concerning the review of the record, the Utah Supreme Court explained that in
determining whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous it is the responsibility of the
appellate court to review the record. Id. at 407. Specifically, the Court held:
It is, therefore, the responsibility of the appellate court to provide some indication
that it performed its sufficiency of the evidence review in the context of the whole
record, or at least that portion of the record to which its attention was drawn by
the appellant's marshaling obligation or the appellee's response to the appellant's
marshaled evidence.
Id2
Second, the Utah Supreme Court explained that "[i]t is also appropriate when
evaluating whether a result was 'clearly erroneous' for the reviewing court to consider
the standard of proof the prevailing party below was required to meet." In re Z.D., 147

re Z.D., 147 P.3d at 406 (quoting Carr, 32 F.3d 1007, 1008 (7th Cir. 1994)). The quote is
as follows:
[The rule 52(a) standard] requires us appellate judges to distinguish between the
situation" in which we think that if we had been the trier of fact we would have
decided the case differently and the situation in which we are firmly convinced
that we would have done so. Our scrutiny of the district judge's findings of fact
thus is deferential, but it is not abject. As the Supreme Court pointed out in the
Concrete Pipe case, we need not, to overturn a finding under the clear-error
standard, adjudge the finding "so unlikely that no reasonable person would find it
to be true."
In re Z.D., 147 P.3d at 406 (quoting Carr, 32 F.3d at 1008) (emphasis in original).
2

This requirement underscores the significance of Robert's failure to marshal as required
under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) as explained above.
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P.3d at 407 (citing Lovett v. Cont Bank & Trust Co., 286 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah 1955)).
The practical result of considering the standard of proof, clear and convincing evidence in
this case, is that "[t]he amount and quality of evidence required to sustain a result based
on a preponderance of evidence is, of course, less than that required to meet a clear and
convincing standard." In re Z.D., 147 P.3d at 407. Consequently, it is less difficult to
demonstrate the insufficiency of evidence where the trial court was to employ a clear and
convincing evidence standard. See id. The Utah Supreme Court concluded its discussion
of the relationship of the evidentiary standard applied by the trial court and the clearly
erroneous standard used by the appellate court as follows:
Still, it is not the role of the appellate court to reverse a trial court merely because
it is convinced that the evidence is inadequate to sustain the result under the
standard of proof applied below. Walker demands more. The result must be
against the clear weight of the evidence or leave the appellate court with a firm
and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.
Id. (emphasis added).
One case that provides some insight into the application of the rule 52(a) clearly
erroneous standard is the case of In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989). In
Estate ofBartell, a wife sued the estate of her deceased spouse seeking a declaration that
she was an "omitted spouse" given that she married her deceased husband after the
creation of his will. Id. at 885. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the
deceased husband intended to provide for his wife through transfers outside his will. Id.
The trial court received and examined evidence concerning the deceased husband's intent
concerning his wife. Id. at 885-86. The trial court examined the statements made by the
deceased husband concerning his intent, the transfers made by the husband to the wife
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prior to his death, the size of the estate relative to the transfers, and the husband's
understanding that he was able to change his will. Id. Specifically, the trial court
determined that the husband's statements concerning his intent were ambiguous, that he
had transferred $230,000 to his wife in the years immediately preceding his death, that
his estate consisted of only about $100,000, and that he was "sufficiently astute in
business matters to have changed his will." Id.
The surviving wife attacked the trial court's findings. Id at 886. In reviewing the
wife's attacks, the Utah Supreme Court explained the applicable standard under rule
52(a) and Walker. Id. Furthermore, the Supreme Court explained that "great deference is
given to the trial court's findings, especially when they are based on an evaluation of
conflicting live testimony." In re Estate ofBartell, 116 P.2d at 886 (citing Walker, 743
P.2d at 192-93; UTAH R. Civ. P. 52(a)). The Utah Supreme Court explained that in
attempting to demonstrate to the appellate court that the trial court was mistaken in its
findings concerning the deceased husband's intent, the surviving wife "must marshal the
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the
trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous." In re Estate ofBartell, 116 P.2d at 886
(citing Walker, 743 P.2d at 193) (internal quotations omitted).
In light of the marshaling requirement and the clearly erroneous standard, the Utah
Supreme Court held the following:
In this case, [the surviving wife] has not even attempted to marshal the evidence
in support of the trial court's findings, nor has she attempted to demonstrate that
the trial court's findings are against the clear weight of the evidence, as required
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by Walker. Instead, she has essentially reargued the factual case submitted below,
construing all evidence in a light most favorable to her case and largely ignoring
the evidence supportive of the trial court's findings.
In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d at 886. Consequently, the Utah Supreme Court was left
u

to rely heavily on the presumption of correctness that attends |the trial court's] findings

under rule 52(a)." Id. In the end, the Utah Supreme Court held that it had considered the
evidence and was "not persuaded that the trial court's findings regarding the decedent's
intent was clearly erroneous." Id.
While the instant case does not deal with an omitted spouse or the related statute,
it does involve a son—Robert—who claims it was not his mother's intent to omit him
from her trust. However, as in the case of In re Estate ofBartell, the trial court in this
matter pointed to specific evidence that supported its findings that it was Ina's intention
to amend her trust to remove Robert. R. 472-475. Similar to In re Estate ofBartell, the
trial court in this case examined the statements made by Ina concerning her intentions
related to her son, the transfers made by Ina to Robert prior to the Update of Trust, the
size of the estate relative to the transfers, and Ina's independent control of her finances
until she was declared incapacitated in 2002. See id.
Intent is manifest in this case by something much more convincing than lack of
action as in the case of In re Estate ofBartell. Specifically, Ina's intentions are clearly
spelled out in the Update to Trust. See Exhibits 2, 2A, 9 & 9A, ^J 3. Furthermore, the
evidence supports the trial court's finding that Ina possessed the capacity to amend her
Trust at the time, being very aware of her property and her family. Trans. 119:6-18,
271:19-272:22.
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Robert's arguments concerning Ina's intent to amend her trust focus almost
exclusively on the actions of Kathy, and not on Ina. Robert discusses extensively
agreements and actions involving his sisters following the Update to Trust in which
Kathy and Jenny arguably treated Robert as a co-trustee and/or beneficiary of the Trust.
However, Kathy and Jenny testified that the purpose of their actions following Ina's
execution of the Update of Trust was to work with Robert and Phyllis as family members
and to avoid discord in the family, which is consistent with Robert's own testimony. See
Trans. 97:7-21, 135:6-20, 201:24-202:4, 214:1-7. In presenting his appeal, Robert has
"essentially reargued the factual case submitted below, construing all evidence in a light
most favorable to [his] case and largely ignoring the evidence supportive of the trial
court's findings" that Ina intended to amend her trust. See In re Estate ofBartell, 779
P.2dat886.
In this case, the trial court had ample and clear evidence to provide a sufficient
basis for its finding that Ina intended to exclude Robert from her trust based on, among
other things, past distributions made by Ina to Robert.
C.

The Trial Court's Memorandum Decision Adequately Demonstrates the
Basis for Its Determination that Ina Holman Intended to Amend Her Trust.

In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court clearly stated its bases for finding that
it was Ina's intent to amend her trust to remove Robert. Robert has asserted that the
evidence did not support the trial court's factual findings because, in part, the trial court
did not expressly address certain actions taken by Kathy following Ina's amendment of
her trust. However, the Memorandum Decision provided a sufficiently detailed
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description of the trial court's bases for ruling as it did, even though the Memorandum
Decision did not negate each argument made by Robert point by point. Furthermore,
Kathy's actions following the execution of the Update to Trust are irrelevant to Ina's
intent at the time Ina executed the Update to Trust.
This Court explained that "[i]n a bench trial, the [trial] court must set forth the
reasons for its decision in enough detail for the reviewing court to determine whether
they are clearly erroneous." Lysenko v. Sawaya, 973 P.2d 445, 448 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
This Court continued by explaining that the "finding must be adequate to ensure the trial
court's discretionary determination was rationally based." Id. (internal citations and
quotations omitted). "To provide meaningful appellate review, the trial court's findings
must be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to clearly show the
evidence upon which they are grounded." N.T. v. State, 928 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah Ct. App.
1996).
However, "a trial court is not required to recite each indicia of reasoning that leads
to its conclusions, nor is it required to marshal the evidence in support of them." Id.
(quoting In re Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 979 (Utah 1996)). Furthermore, "a trial court
is also not required to explain why it found certain witnesses less credible or why some
testimony was given less weight or considered irrelevant." NT, 928 P.2d at 399. The
Utah Supreme Court explained,
A trial court need not resolve every conflicting evidentiary issue, nor is the court
required to negate allegations in its findings of fact. Rather, the trial court's
factual findings must be articulated with sufficient detail so that the basis of the
ultimate conclusion can be understood.
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Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 886 P.2d 514, 521 (Utah
1994) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (quoted by D.J. Invest. Group, LLC, v.
DAE/Westbrook, LLC, 147 P.3d 414, 422-23 (Utah 2006)). After determining that the
trial court's memorandum decision and findings in Consolidation Coal Co. were "wellreasoned and fully supported by the record," the Utah Supreme Court held, "It was not
necessary for the trial court to negate [appellant's] version of the case point by point. The
trial court needed to make only those findings necessary to its decision ..." Id.
In this case, the trial court articulated its factual findings with sufficient detail so
as to leave no doubt as the basis for its ultimate conclusion that it was Ina's intent to
amend her trust to remove Robert. In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court made ten
numbered factual findings. R. 476-477. Among those specific findings of fact, the trial
court determined that Ina executed the Update to Trust. R. 476. The trial court also listed
facts upon which it relied throughout its conclusions of law. R. 467-476.
The trial court discusses specific facts that serve to provide sufficient detail to its
basis for determining that it was Ina's intent to amend her trust. For example, the trial
court discusses the fact that Robert borrowed money totaling $124,000 from his mother,
that Ina and Robert entered into an understanding by which Ina would forgive the debt in
exchange for removing Robert from the trust, and that Robert was sending
3

In applying the federal rule upon which Utah's Rule 52(a) is based, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained that "to be adequate, factual findings
need only be explicit enough to give this court a clear understanding of the basis of the
district court's decision and to enable us to determine the grounds on which the district
court reached its decision." Toombs v. Leone, 111 F.2d 465, 469 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1985)
(responding to appellant's assertion that findings of fact are inadequate because they are
mixed with court's conclusions of law).
32

communications to Ina consistent with this understanding. See R. 474-475. The trial
court also identifies other relevant facts, such as the lack of any record that Robert ever
repaid his debt to Ina and the specific language of the amendment. Id,
The trial court's Memorandum Decision then specifically addresses Robert's
assertions that Ina's amendment to her trust was a product of undue influence exercised
by Kathy and/or a lack of capacity on the part of Ina.4 See R. 472-474. In so doing, the
trial court specifically addresses those facts that refute Robert's assertion that Ina was
unduly influenced. For example, the trial court points out that the Update to Trust
mirrored Robert's own correspondence, that Robert's wife and Ina did not get along, and
that Robert had not communicated much, if at all, with Ina in the two years prior to the
amendment. R. 474. In discussing the alleged lack of capacity, the trial court pointed out
that Robert was not present in Utah and was not in a position to testify about Ina's lack of
intent, and that each of the children testified that Ina maintained control over her financial
assets until she was declared incapacitated in 2002. R. 473-474. These factual findings
identified by the trial court in its Memorandum Decision serve to provide sufficient detail
to demonstrate to this Court that the trial court's decision was well-reasoned and fully
supported.
Significantly, as asserted by Robert, the trial court did not negate Robert's version
of the case point by point. For example, the trial court did not address interactions
between Kathy and Robert following Ina's the Update to Trust in which Kathy treated

4

Based on Utah law, Robert would have likely been required to prove undue influence by
clear and convincing evidence. See Russell v. Russell, 852 P.2d 997, 999 n.2 (Utah 1993).

Robert as a successor co-trustee or that Kathy allegedly attempted to conceal the
amendment from Robert. However, the Utah Supreme Court does not require the trial
court to negate Robert's case point by point. More importantly, Kathy's actions following
the execution of the Update to Trust are irrelevant in determining whether Ina intended to
amend her Trust. Given their lack of relevance, the trial court understandably declined to
comment on Kathy's actions. For those reasons, the trial court's Memorandum Decision
more than adequately provides the trial court's basis and refutes Robert's arguments and
should be affirmed.
D.

Assumption that Trial Court Applied Correct Evidentiary Standard.

Where the trial court in this matter did not expressly state the evidentiary standard
it was using, the proper assumption is that the trial court applied the correct evidentiary
standard in finding that it was Ina's intent to modify her trust to exclude Robert. Robert
has asserted, in part, that the trial court's failure to state the specific evidentiary standard
lends itself to the presumption that the trial court applied the lower standard of
preponderance of the evidence rather than the clear and convincing evidence standard.
See Appellant's Brief, 13, 16-17. However, no grounds exist for creating that
presumption.
Where a trial court does not expressly state the standard of evidence employed in
reaching its decision, appellate courts generally assume that the trial court used the
correct standard. See, e.g., Anchorage Police & Fire Retirement Sys. v. Gallion, 65 P.3d
876, 883-84 (Alaska 2003). For example, the Alaska Supreme Court was asked to review
whether a "court failed to apply the reasonable doubt standard of proof." Id. at 883. An
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appellant challenged the Alaska trial court, in part, because it had failed to state the
standard of proof it applied in a contempt proceeding. Id. The Alaska Supreme Court held
the following:
We have held in other contexts that a trial court need not explicitly state all of its
factual findings so long as its findings are adequate to reveal its reasoning
process. Courts elsewhere have held that a trial court need not explicitly state the
standard of proof it is applying if there is no dispute about the applicable standard.
We will normally assume that the trial court has applied the correct
standard.
Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Alaska ruling is
consistent with decisions in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Johnson v. De Toledo, 763 A.2d
28, 32 (Conn. Ct. App. 2000) (We must... assume that the court applied the correct
standard of proof in the present case.'5); In re CT, 724 A.2d 590, 597 (D.C. Ct. App.
1999) ("Absent any indication to the contrary, we presume that the trial judge knew the
proper standard of proof to apply and did in fact apply it."); Gluth Bros. Constr., Inc. v.
Union Nat. Bank, 518 N.E.2d 1345, 1350 (111. Ct. App. 1988); Smith v. Bull Run Sch.
Dist, 722 P.2d 27, 30 (Ore. Ct. App. 1986); Ross v. Superior Court, 569 P.2d 727, 737
(Cal. 1977); People v. Tuschen, 2007 Cal App. Unpub. Lexis 7251, 5-6 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007).
Furthermore, the discussion of the clear and convincing standard in the parties'
pleadings provides further evidence that the trial court knew the proper evidentiary
standard and applied it. For instance, in an unpublished Minnesota Court of Appeals
opinion, an appellant challenged a trial court's decision by arguing "that the district court
failed to require that [appellee] prove undue influence by 'clear and convincing evidence'
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because the standard of proof is not mentioned in the district court's order." In re Estate
ofReichenberger, 2007 Minn. App. Unpub. Lexis 315, 9-10 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held, "But the failure of the district court to
mention this standard of proof in its order does not, ipso facto, establish that the district
court did not require it, particularly when it was briefed and argued by both parties." Id.
at 10.
As in the case of In re Estate ofReichenberger, the parties in this case argued to
the trial court that the applicable evidentiary standard for determining Ina's intent to
modify the trust was the clear and convincing standard. For example, Phyllis filed her
Motions in Limine with the trial court on November 10, 2005. R. 280. In her motion,
Phyllis moved the trial court to apply the clear and convincing standard to Ina's intent to
modify the trust. R. 280, ^f 2. In reply, Kathy and Jenny, while opposing other portions of
Phyllis's motion, did not oppose the portion concerning the clear and convincing
evidence standard. See R. 298-303, at 299. Additionally, in two of the post trial
memoranda requested by the trial court, the parties outlined the applicability of the clear
and convincing evidentiary standard. See R. 358-384, at 377 (Phyllis); R. 385-458, 450
(Appellees). Given that the parties had briefed the trial court on the proper standard, this
Court should assume the trial court knew and applied the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard with regards to Ina's intent to modify her trust, and rule accordingly.
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III.

The Trial Court Was Within Its Broad Discretion to Admit Evidence When It
Admitted the Duplicate and Original Updates to Trust of Ina C. Holman.
While he cites other issues, Robert's objection to Exhibits 2, 2A, 9, and 9 A can be

summarized as follows. First, Robert objects to Exhibits 2 and 9, the photocopies of the
Update to Trust, because he disputes the authenticity of the original Update to Trust.
Second, Robert objects to Exhibits 2A and 9A, the originals of the Update to Trust,
because they were admitted into evidence following the close of the subject hearing.
Based on the extensive testimony received by the trial court concerning the Update
to Trust, no genuine question existed as to the authenticity of the original Update to Trust
that would have precluded admission of the photocopies, Exhibits 2 and 9, into evidence
by the trial court. Furthermore, the trial court's decision to admit Exhibits 2A and 9A into
evidence following the hearing without receiving additional testimony on the documents
was within the trial court's discretion given the extensive testimony concerning the
documents at the time of the hearing.
A.

No Genuine Question Concerning Authenticity Exists that Would Merit
Exclusion of the Updates to Trust from Evidence.

At the time of the hearing, no genuine question existed concerning the authenticity
of the Update to Trust that would have precluded the trial court from admitting the
duplicates and the originals of the Update to Trust into evidence. Robert has asserted that
the trial court erred in admitting into evidence Exhibits 2 and 9 because the parties were
"only able to produce photocopies of [the] documents" at the time of the hearing and
because appellant's counsel "doubted the authenticity of the originals." Appellant's Brief
21. Robert has based his objections upon rule 1002 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
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Rule 1002 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "[t]o prove the content of a
writing ..., the original writing ... is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules
or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of this State or by Statute." UTAH R.
EviD. 1002. Rule 1003 then provides for the interchangeability of duplicates with
originals. See UTAH R. EviD. 1003. It states that "[a] duplicate is admissible to the same
extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the
original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the
original.55 UTAH R. EVID. 1003.5
In discussing the federal rule that is the equivalent of Utah's best evidence rule,
Weinstein5s Federal Evidence explains, "Duplicates may ordinarily be admitted to the
same extent as originals. The concept of the 'duplicate5 broadens the concept of the
original to include mechanical reproductions produced by modern technology that further
the goal of preciseness that is still paramount when dealing with writings ..,.55
WEINSTEIN 5 S FED. EVID.

§ 1002.04(3).6

5

In rule 1001, the Utah Rules of Evidence define "duplicate55 as "a counterpart produced
by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of
photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic
recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which
accurately reproduce the original.55 UTAH R. EviD. 1001(4).
6
"Once authenticity and fairness issues are resolved, duplicates and originals are
generally interchangeable for evidentiary purposes. For example, a duplicate is
admissible when the opposing party concedes its accuracy. Even when accuracy is not
conceded, courts routinely accept duplicates as a convenience to the court and the parties
unless there are persuasive reasons for rejecting the evidence. Thus if there is no reason
to believe that the duplicate is inaccurate or that a party is attempting to commit a fraud
on the court, for example, by altering the proffered evidence, the duplicate will be
admitted.55 WEINSTEIN5S FED. EVID. § 1003.02[1].
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In the context of the best evidence rule, this Court explained, "Trial courts are
afforded broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence; thus we will not
disturb a trial court's ruling whether to admit or exclude evidence absent an abuse of
discretion." Vigil v. Div. of Child & Family Servs., 107 P.3d 716, 718 (Utah Ct. App.
2005) (citing Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 17 P.3d 1110, 1114 (Utah 2000)). In Gorostieta,
the Utah Supreme Court explained that "[t]he admissibility of an item of evidence is a
legal question. However, the trial court has a great deal of discretion in determining
whether to admit or exclude evidence, and its ruling will not be overturned unless there is
an abuse of discretion." 17 P.3d at 1114 (internal quotations and citations omitted). See
also State v. Casias, 772 P.2d 975, 977 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("In the absence of an abuse
of discretion, the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be
disturbed.")
In its practical application, Weinstein's Federal Evidence explained that parties
offering evidence are "rarely precluded from producing significant relevant evidence
because of the best evidence rule." WEINSTEIN'S FED. EVID. § 1002.04(3). Instead of
working as an inflexible bar to the entry of evidence, "[t]he function of the best evidence
rule today is not to accord victory to the party who best follows the rules, but to ensure
that the trier of fact is presented with the most accurate evidence practicable in those
situations where informed legal judgment has concluded that precision is essential."
WEINSTEIN'S FED. EVID.

§ 1002.04(3).

How to apply rules 1002 and 1003 to the instant matter is best illustrated by this
Court's decision in Nielsen v. Estate ofHefferon, 1999 UT App 317. In Nielsen, the trial
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court concluded that the best evidence rule "prevented consideration of extrinsic evidence
to determine the parties' intent and the scope and content" of an agreement entered into
by the parties. Id. at 3-4. This Court overturned the trial court's exclusion of the evidence
and held that the trial court should have admitted the subject documents. Id. at 4. In so
doing, this Court explained:
The best evidence rule provides that the original writing is required to prove the
content of such writing. The trial court erred by relying on these provisions in that
plaintiff does not dispute the content of the release produced by defendant.
Rather, plaintiff claims that defendant either fraudulently induced her into signing
the release or fraudulently altered the release. The best evidence rule has no
application to the admissibility of plaintiff s evidence supporting these claims.
Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
This case is similar to Nielsen because Robert is not contesting that the duplicates
(exhibits 2 and 9) were inaccurate copies of the originals. At the time of the hearing,
Robert's attorney objected to the admissibility of exhibits 2 and 9 by saying that "if it's
being submitted for the purpose of establishing at one point in time there were two
originals I'd have no objection to that." Trans., 57:17-19. See also Appellant's Brief, 21.
Robert's attorney then stated that he would have to object if "it's being submitted for the
purposes of helping the court deal with the administration of this estate for interpreting
the estate" because he thought that "we need the originals for the court to see what to
interpret." Trans. 57:19-23. Significantly, Robert's attorney then explained that "if it's
simply establishing that at one point in time there were two now missing originals I have
no objection to it being admitted for that limited purpose just establishing that at some
point there were two." Trans. 57:23-58:1. In other words, Robert did not, and apparently
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does not, question that exhibits 2 and 9 are accurate duplicates of the original documents
(exhibits 2A and 9A). In fact, exhibits 2 and 2A, as well as 9 and 9A, are exactly
identical.
Significantly, based on Nielsen, Robert's assertions that "a genuine question ... as
to the authenticity of the original" are not addressable in the context of the best evidence
rule. As in the case of Nielsen, Robert is questioning the events surrounding the creation
of the Update to Trust. Robert has asserted that the subject exhibits are a result of undue
influence or fraud on the part of Kathy. However, as in the case of Nielsen where
assertions concerning fraudulent inducement did not preclude the admissibility of
evidence, the best evidence rule does not preclude the admission of the original and
duplicate Updates to Trust in this case because of assertions concerning undue influence,
lack of capacity, or fraud. Given that the best evidence rule was not created to address
with the admissibility of exhibits in this context and on these grounds, this Court should
affirm the trial court's decision to admit exhibits 2, 2A, 9, and 9A into evidence.
Furthermore, even assuming that a genuine question as to the authenticity of the
exhibits related to undue influence and/or lack of capacity could preclude the trial court
from admitting the subject exhibits into evidence based upon rules 1002 and 1003 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence, the trial court received sufficient evidence during the course of
the hearing to determine that no genuine question existed. For example, during the
hearing, the trial court received evidence from the notary public —Lyle Gertsch —who

7

Mr. Gertsch was the only independent witness offered at the time of the hearing by the
parties. David McBeth represented the trustee. Central Bank. The other parties all
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witnessed Ina's signature of the original Updates to Trust. See Trans. 62:22-65:11.
Among other things, Mr. Gertsch testified concerning his visit to the home where Ina was
living and his interactions with her. See id. The trial court also received testimony from
Kathy concerning conversations with her mother related to Ina's frustration with Robert
and the amendment of the trust, and Kathy's preparation of the Updates to Trust pursuant
to her mother's request. See Trans. 62:22-65:11, 120:6-15, 120:23-122:22.
Significantly, the trial court ultimately determined that Ina did not lack the
capacity to create the Updates to Trust and that Ina was not unduly influenced to create
the Updates to Trust. See R. 472-474. Given that the trial court received sufficient
evidence to make an ultimate decision concerning the undue influence and capacity
issues for the case as a whole, the trial court also received sufficient evidence to
determine that no genuine question existed concerning authenticity that would preclude
the admission of exhibits 2, 2A, 9, and 9 A. For those reasons, this Court should affirm
the trial court's holding to admit the subject exhibits into evidence.
B.

Based Upon Information Received at Hearing, Trial Court Acted Within Its
Discretion by Admitting Exhibits 2A and 9A into Evidence.

The trial court acted within its broad discretion when it admitted into evidence the
original Updates to Trust following the hearing given the extensive evidence related to
the duplicate Updates to Trust presented to the trial court at the hearing and because the
admission does not prejudice Robert. Furthermore, this Court should affirm the trial
claimed some sort of interest in the Trust. Mr. Gertsch had no interest, beneficial or
otherwise, in the outcome of the hearing.
8
See UTAH CODE § 78-25-9 ("Any writing may be proved ... (1) by any one who saw the
writing executed/')
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court's decision to receive Exhibits 2A and 9A into evidence given Robert's failure to
marshal the evidence supporting an abuse of discretion.
The Utah Supreme Court explained, "A trial court has broad discretion to admit or
exclude evidence and its determination typically will only be disturbed if it constitutes an
abuse of discretion." State v. Whittle, 989 P.2d 52, 58 (Utah 1999). Furthermore,
"[although the admission or exclusion of evidence is a question of law, we review a trial
court's decision to admit or exclude specific evidence for an abuse of discretion." State v.
Cruz-Meza, 76 P.3d 1165, 8 (Utah 2003). An abuse of discretion takes place if the trial
court acts unreasonably. Whittle, 989 P.2d at 58. See also Glacier Land Co., LLC, v.
Claudia Klawe & Assocs., LLC, 154 P.3d 852, 858 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (The trial
court's decision should not be overturned "unless it is beyond the limits of
reasonability.").
In this case, the trial court acted within its broad discretion to admit evidence
when it admitted the originals of the Update to Trust following the close of evidence.
During the course of the hearing, the trial court received extensive evidence concerning
the execution and purpose of the Updates to Trust. See, e.g., Trans. 77:7-78:9, 120:6-15,
120:23-122:22, 280:12-16. Among the evidence received by the trial court concerning the
execution, the public notary who witnessed the execution of the Updates to Trust verified
their authenticity. See Trans. 62:22-65:11. Additionally, the trial court received extensive
evidence from both Robert and Kathy, as well as others, related to whether the Updates to
Trust reflected Ina's intent. See Trans. 120:6-15, 120:23-122:22. See also Exhibit 15ffl[2,
5; Trans. 189:17-190:3.
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Robert has asserted that admission of the original Updates to Trust following the
close of the hearing was prejudicial because Robert did not have an opportunity to
respond to the documents that purported to be originals, see Appellant's Brief, 14 & 23;
because it deprived Robert of the opportunity to confront witnesses, examine documents,
and object to out-of court statements, see id. at 23; and because Robert was not provided
with the opportunity to cross-examine Kathy as to why the documents were not produced
at the original hearing, see id. at 24. However, based on the extensive testimony
previously received by the trial court concerning the duplicate Updates to Trust, the trial
court did not act beyond the limits of reasonability by not providing Robert with an
opportunity to question Kathy and Jenny concerning the originals. Furthermore, any
prejudice caused by the trial court not permitting Robert to re-open the hearing was
ameliorated by the trial court's own refusal to receive into evidence the additional
affidavits provided by Kathy and Jenny that accompanied the original Updates to Trust.
See R. 477.
In the end, the trial court simply had to compare the original Updates to Trust with
the duplicates previously provided to it to determine whether the documents were
identical. Upon determining that they were identical, and that sufficient evidence
previously provided a foundation for admission of the duplicates, the trial court acted
within its discretion to admit the originals. For that reason, the trial court acted within its
broad discretion when it admitted the original Updates to Trust into evidence.
Significantly, even if the trial court acted beyond the bounds of reasonability in
admitting into evidence the original Updates to Trust, Robert was not prejudiced by the
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admission given that identical photocopies were previously admitted by the Court and
extensive testimony was received by the trial court related to the Updates to the Trust of
Ina C. Holman. This Court explained that "even if evidence is erroneously admitted, that
fact alone is insufficient to set aside a verdict unless it has had a substantial influence in
bringing about the verdict." Glacier Land Co., LLC, 154 P.3d at 858. This principle is
consistent with rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which provides that error on a
ruling on evidence "may not be predicated on a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless a substantial right of the party is affected." Given that the trial court had already
received into evidence the identical photocopies of the Updates to Trust and
corresponding testimony, the admission of the originals had no appreciable effect on the
trial court's ultimate judgment. For that reason, no prejudice has resulted from the
admission that would require this Court to overturn the trial court's admission of the
original Updates to Trust.
Finally, Robert has failed to marshal the evidence necessary for this Court to
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting exhibits 2, 2A, 9, and
9A. Consequently, because Robert "has failed to marshal the evidence supporting" the
admission of the subject exhibits, this Court cannot "conclude that the trial court abused
its discretion." United Park City Mines Co., 140 P.3d at 1209. For the reasons stated
above, this Court should affirm the trial court's admission of the original Updates to
Trust into evidence in this matter.
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C.

Rule 1004 of the Utah Rules of Evidence Is Inapplicable to the Instant
Case.

Robert has asserted on appeal that the trial court should not have admitted Exhibits
2 and 9 into evidence given that the exceptions listed in rule 1004 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence were not satisfied. However, rule 1004 of the Utah Rules of Evidence does not
apply in this case because the exhibits were not "other evidence of contents," but
duplicates as defined in rule 1001(4).
The purpose of rule 1004 is not to exclude duplicates, the admissibility of which is
addressed in rule 1003, but to address the admissibility of "other evidence of the contents
of a writing, recording, or photograph." See UTAH R. EVID. 1003-1004. Rule 1004 allows
for the admission of other evidence of the contents of writings under specific exceptions
involving lost or destroyed originals, unobtainable originals, originals in the possession
of the opposing party, or other collateral matters. U T A H R . EVID. 1004.
Duplicates as defined in rule 1001(4) of the Utah Rules of Evidence are not the
"other evidence of the contents of a writing" that is the subject of rule 1004. Other
evidence is typically things such as oral testimony to prove the content of a lost letter, see
Klein v. Frank, 534 F.2d 1104, 1107-08 (5th Cir. 1976). For that reason, rule 1004 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence are inapplicable in determining the admissibility of Exhibits 2,
2A, 9, and 9A.
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IV.

Robert Holman's Appeal Is Frivolous.
This Court should award the Appellees there attorney's fees given that Robert's

appeal is frivolous. Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides the
following:
Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a
motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it
shall award just damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in
Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may
order that the damage be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
UTAH R. APP. P. 33(a). Rule 33(b) defines frivolous appeal as u one that is not grounded
in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend,
modify, or reverse existing law." UTAH R. APP. 33(b).
In this case, Robert's appeal is not grounded in fact. As explained above, the trial
court received and admitted into evidence extensive evidence of Ina's intent to amend her
trust. Regardless, Robert has appealed this matter and failed to cite any of the evidence
that served as the trial court's bases for finding intent. For that reason, Robert's appeal is
frivolous and this Court should award the Appellees their attorney's fees incurred in
responding to this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm the trial court's findings given that Robert completely
failed to marshal the evidence necessary to contest the trial court's findings that the
Update to Trust reflected Ina's intent and that no genuine question as to the authenticity
of the Update to Trust exists.
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Furthermore, this Court should affirm the trial court's finding that the Update to
Trust reflected Ina's intent given that the clear weight of the evidence supports the trial
court's finding. Specifically, the trial court properly found that the Update to Trust
reflected Ina's intent because the Update to Trust states the reasons for which Ina
executed it, Ina possessed the capacity to amend her trust and was not unduly influenced,
and because her intent to correct the distributions to her family—namely Robert—was
testified to at the time of the hearing.
The trial court acted reasonably when it admitted into evidence the duplicate and
original Updates to Trust. No genuine question existed concerning the authenticity of the
original Update to Trust that would merit the exclusion of the duplicates under rule 1003
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The trial court received extensive evidence from the
public notary who witnessed the documents execution, as well as Kathy, that outlined the
Update to Trust's purpose, preparation, and execution. With regards to the admission into
evidence of the original Updates to Trust following the conclusion of the hearing, the trial
court acted reasonably in admitting the originals because of the extensive evidence before
the trial court concerning the duplicates, because the trial court declined to receive
testimony from any of the parties, and because the trial court could have determined that
the originals were identical to the duplicates by simply comparing the documents.
Finally, even if the trial court did not act reasonably in admitting the original Updates to
Trust, Robert was not prejudiced by the admission because all of the information
contained in the originals was previously admitted into evidence in the duplicate Updates
to Trust.
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For the stated reasons, the Appellees respectfully request that the trial court be
affirmed in all respects. Furthermore, the Appellees respectfully request that the trial
court award them their attorney's fees incurred in responding to Robert's frivolous
appeal.
DATED this V

day of October, 2007.
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC

Mark F- Ropinsor
Morgai/Pne
Attorneys for Kathleen Robinson,
Jenevieve Hoiman & Spencer Family
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I hereby certify that on this 7

day of October, 2007, I caused eight copies of

the Brief of Appellees, one of which contains an original signature, to be mailed to the
Clerk of the Court of Appeals, by first class mail, postage prepaid, and 2 copies to be
mailed, first class, with sufficient postage prepaid, to:
Utah Court of Appeals
Attn: Clerk of the Court of Appeals
PO Box 140230
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230
John L. Valentine
Howard, Lewis & Petersen, PC
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, UT 84603
Douglas T. Hall
Attorney at Law
7321 South State Street, Suite A
Midvale,UT 84047-6105
Hunt W. Garner
Attorney at Law
2651 Washington Blvd., Ste. 5
Ogden,UT 84401
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ADDENDUM
1. In re Estate of Reichenberger, 2007 Minn. App. Unpub. Lexis 315, 9-10 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2007).
2. Agreement Establishing the Ina C. Holman Trust dated July 27, 1990, Hearing
Exhibit 1.
3. Letter from Robert Holman to Ina C. Holman, undated, Hearing Exhibit 15.
4. Letter from Robert Holman to Ina C. Holman, dated October 21, 1994, Hearing
Exhibit 16.
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Exhibit 1
In re Estate of Reichenberger, 2007 Minn. App. Unpub. Lexis 315, 9-10 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2007).

LEXSEE 2007 MINN. APP. UNPUB. LEXIS 3 J 5

Positive
As of: Oct 08, 2007
In re: Estate of Edward J. Reichenberger, a/k/a Edward Reichenberger, Deceased.
A06-653
COURT OF APPEALS OF MINNESOTA
2007Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 315
April 10, 2007, Filed
NOTICE:
[*1] THIS OPINION WILL BE UNPUBLISHED AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS
PROVIDED BY MINNESOTA STATUTES.

and that the findings and conclusions of the district court
were not supported by the evidence or law. We affirm in
part and reverse in part.

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Review denied by In re
Estate of Reichenberger, 2007 Minn. LEXIS 330 (Minn.,
June 19, 2007)

FACTS

DISPOSITION:

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

COUNSEL: For Linda Soukup, Appellant: Mary R.
Vasaly, Maslon, Edelman, Borman & Brand, LLP, Minneapolis, MN.
For Dale Hilk, Respondent: Patrick J. Neaton, Neaton &
Puklich, PLLP, Minnetonka, MN.
JUDGES: Considered and decided by Minge, Presiding
Judge; Stoneburner, Judge; and Dietzen, Judge.
OPINION BY: DIETZEN
OPINION
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
DIETZEN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court order and resulting judgment which, inter alia, admitted a June 2001
will of testator to probate, but voided a competing will
executed four months later due to undue influence upon
the testator, and awarded attorney fees against appellant
and a non-party. Appellant argues that the district court
failed to apply the proper burden of proof to the evidence

This is a contest involving competing wills executed
by Edward Reichenberger [*2] (testator) on June 7,
2001 (the June will), in which respondent Dale Hilk is a
residuary beneficiary, and a will executed on October 17,
2001 (the October will), in which appellant Linda Soukup and non-party Richard Blanchard, are residuary
beneficiaries. Testator died on November 8, 2003. Each
party filed a petition to probate the will under which that
party was a residuary beneficiary.
Testator, who was born in July 1913, together with
his older brother, John Reichenberger, inherited a 152acre farm which they owned and resided on from April
1945 until their respective deaths. The Reichenberger
farm (farm) is located in Carver County between Waconia and St. Bonifacius. Soukup and Blanchard lived near
the Reichenberger farm, and their relationship with the
Reichenbergers dates back to the mid-1980s when Soukup and Blancard sought to purchase boulders from the
Reichenbergers for their landscaping business. Hilk, born
out of wedlock in July 1935, is the son of John Reichenberger. Although Hilk lived in the vicinity of the farm,
he did not have any significant contact with either testator or John until the early 1980s.
The farmhouse, occupied by testator and John, was
dilapidated and [*3] possessed no electricity, plumbing,
running water, or heating system, other than a small
wood-burning stove. Soot and grease covered the floor,
walls, and ceiling, and numerous windowpanes were
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broken, covered only in cardboard The state of the
farmhouse was not due to poverty, but rather the lifestyle
choice of the two bachelor brothers

tive who lived in Waconia and "looked out" for him
Testator also expressed his desire that attorney Choi continue to pursue the Johnson litigation

In May 1988, the Reichenbergers signed a purchase
agreement/option in favor of William and Suzanne Johnson When the Reichenbergers refused to comply with
the terms of the agreement, the Johnsons brought a lawsuit In January 1994, the parties settled the lawsuit,
which was approved by the district court Later, the Reichenbergers, with the assistance of Soukup and Blanchard, hired a new attorney to set aside the settlement
Those efforts were unsuccessful

Olson then prepared and had testator execute a POA
appointing Hilk as attorney-in-fact, and sent a letter to
attorney Choi In his letter to Choi, Olson observed that
testator was "clearly a vulnerable adult," but that he "retains mental alertness" and "expresses himself adequately," but "is 88 years old " Olson also instructed
Choi that Soukup and Blanchard must cease interfering
in testator's life decisions, but that Choi could continue to
pursue the Johnson litigation

Hilk retired in October 1997 and began a practice of
visiting testator and John at the farm three days a week
Subsequently, Hilk began handlmg some financial matters for testator and John, who were 84 and 87 years old
respectively, and arranging for the purchase of burial
plots at the local cemetery In April 1998, Hilk consulted
with attorney Paul Melchert, who prepared a power of
attorney [x4] (POA), and assisted testator in the execution of a will The 1998 will provided, inter aha, that the
residuary of testator's estate would go to his nephews—
Hilk and Kay Berrigan—m equal shares and appointed
Hilk as his personal representative

Subsequently, a dispute arose in which Hilk [x6]
accused Soukup and Blanchard of interfering with the
lives and affairs of testator and John Attorneys Choi and
Olson agreed to visit testator at the farm on September
20, 2001, m an attempt to resolve the dispute When Olson arrived, he was surprised to see Soukup and Blanchard at the meeting and requested that they leave Olson
believed testator's demeanor had changed considerably
from his previous meetings with him in which testator
was lucid, clear, and reasonably animated But on this
date testator was "like a deer in headlights" and "frozen
in his chair " During the meeting, Blanchard asked testator, "You don't want him as your attorney any more, do
you," and testator responded, "No " At that point Olson
left the farmhouse considering himself to have been fired
by testator

In January 2000, Soukup and Blanchard convinced
testator and John to commence a malpractice claim
against their former attorneys arising out of the Johnson
litigation When Hilk discovered the existence of the
malpractice lawsuit, he had Melchert send a letter to
Soukup and Blanchard advising them that Hilk was the
attorney-in-fact for testator and John, and urged them to
stay away from the brothers and terminate the litigation
But Soukup and Blanchard arranged a meeting with
attorney John Choi to pursue the litigation Following a
meeting with the Reichenbergers, Choi had them execute
revocations of Hilk's POA and name Soukup and
Blanchard as their new attorneys-in-fact, but did not notify Hilk
In April 2001, John was admitted to a Waconia hospital In June 2001, testator met with Melchert to change
his will The will (June will) provided, inter aha, that the
residue of his estate went to Hilk, and that he was intentionally omitting [*5] all other persons except for a relative, Joan Stoltman, who received three thousand dollars
When Melchert became aware that Soukup was
POA for testator and John, he contacted attorney Kerry
Olson and, on the basis of a conflict of interest due to his
dealings with Hilk, asked Olson to speak with testator
Attorney Olson met with testator at the farm on September 7 2001, and observed the "appalling' living conditions During the meetmg, testator stated that he wanted
Hilk to be his attorney-in-fact because Hilk was a rela-

Soukup and Blanchard then made arrangements for
testator to meet with attorney William Koenig to execute
a new will At the meetmg, testator requested that a will
be completed immediately because he was going into the
hospital that same day, which was not true Because it
was a relatively short will, Koenig prepared it, and contrary to his usual practice had testator execute it that
same day The October [*7] will made no reference to
testator's desire to be buried m the local cemetery, and
left the residuary of his estate m equal one-third shares to
Soukup, Blanchard, and Joan Stoltman Soukup and
Blanchard then took testator to the Carver County Courthouse where he deposited the will at the probate department The two court employees that spoke to testator
made the following notation on the will jacket "[Testator] did not know the day or year when he signed the
back We had to tell him Don't think he was of sound
mmd "
At trial, the parties vigorously disputed each other's
motivations, the validity of the October will, and whether
it was the subject of undue influence by Soukup and
Blanchard Following a trial, the district court filed extensive findings of fact conclusions of law, and an order
and judgment admitting the June 2001 will to probate,
appointing Hilk as personal representative and conclud-
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ing that the October will was void and the product of
undue influence by Soukup and Blanchard. In the main,
the court credited the testimony of Hilk and discredited
the testimony of Soukup and Blanchard. Also, the district
court concluded that the estate is entitled to judgment
[*8] against Soukup and Blanchard for attorney fees that
the estate had incurred. This appeal follows.
DECISION

I.
Soukup argues that the district court erred in holding
that the October will was invalid because it was the
product of undue influence by Soukup and non-party
Blanchard. The district court's findings of fact will not be
set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Minn. R. Civ.
P. 52.01; In re Estate of Anderson, 384 N. W.2d 518, 520
(Minn. App. 1986). "Findings are 'clearly erroneous' only
if 'the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.'" Id. (quoting In re Estate of Congdon, 309
N.W.2d 261, 266 n.7 (Minn. 1981)). The existence of
undue influence is a question of fact. In re Estate of
Reay, 249 Minn. 123, 124, 81 N. W.2d277, 279 (1957).
Initially, Soukup argues that the district court erred
by adopting verbatim Hilk's proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The verbatim adoption of a
party's proposed findings and conclusions is "hardly
commendable" as it raises the question of whether the
district court "independently [*9] evaluated each party's
testimony and evidence." Pederson v. State, 649 N. W.2d
161, 163 (Minn. 2002); Bliss v. Bliss, 493 N.W.2d 583,
590 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Feb. 12,
1993). But, standing alone, it does not constitute grounds
for reversal. Pederson, 649 N.W.2d at 163; Dukes v.
State, 621 N.W.2d246, 259 (Minn. 2001).
When a district court adopts a party's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim, a "careful
and searching review of the record" is required. Dukes,
621 N.W.2d at 258. Here, the district court did adopt
Hilk's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Thus, our caselaw requires that we conduct a careful and
searching review of the record to determine whether the
district court's findings are clearly erroneous.
Soukup also argues that the district court failed to
require that Hilk prove undue influence by "clear and
convincing evidence" because the standard of proof is
not mentioned in the district court's order. It is well settled that the will contestant must establish undue influence by clear and convincing proof. Minn. Stat. § 524.3407 [*10] (2006); In re Estate of Pundt, 280 Minn. 102,
104, 157 N.W.2d839, 841 (1968). But the failure of the
district court to mention this standard of proof in its or-

der does not, ipso facto, establish that the district court
did not require it, particularly when it was briefed and
argued by both parties. Thus, our review necessarily focuses on whether clear and convincing evidence exists in
the record to support the district court's finding that the
will was the product of undue influence.
We will invalidate a will that is the product of undue
influence if it is proven that another person exercised
influence over the testator so that the will reflects the
intent of the other person and not of the testator. Estate
of Reay, 249 Minn, at 126, 81 N. W.2d at 280; In re Estate of Torgersen, 711 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Minn. App.
2006), review denied (Minn. Jun. 20, 2006). "Undue influence must be such as to substitute the will of the person exercising it for that of the testator, thereby making
the written result express the purpose and intent of such
person, not those of the testator. "In re Estate of Marsden,
217 Minn. 1, 9, 13 N.W.2d 765, 770 (1944). [*11] "It
must be equivalent to moral coercion or constraint overpowering the will of the testator," and "must operate at
the very time the will is made and dominate and control
its making." Id. Direct evidence of undue influence is
generally not available and circumstantial evidence can
be sufficient. In re Estate of Olson, 176 Minn. 360, 365,
223 N.W. 677, 679(1929).
The supreme court has identified six factors to determine whether undue influence has been exerted upon
a testator. In re Estate of Wilson, 223 Minn. 409, 413, 27
N.W.2d 429, 432 (1947); In re Estate of Opsahl, 448
N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. App. 1989). We turn to the six
factors.
A. Opportunity to Exercise Influence

Soukup argues that she did not isolate testator or
make him dependent upon her, and thus no "opportunity"
existed for her to exercise undue influence. The district
court concluded that Soukup and Blanchard "made [testator] dependent upon them for his continued ability to
live at the Reichenberger Farm and Soukup had [testator's Power of Attorney."
During the period immediately before and after the
execution of the October will, Soukup [*12] was testator's attorney-in-fact and frequently visited testator at the
farm, at a time when because of John's hospitalization,
testator was regularly alone. And Soukup and Blanchard
made the appointment with attorney Koenig to draft the
October will, transported testator to the office, and
brought him to the county clerk's office to file it. Thus,
clear and convincing evidence exists in the record that
Soukup had the opportunity to exercise influence on testator.
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B. Active Participation in the Preparation of the Will

Soukup argues that the evidence is insufficient to
demonstrate Soukup's active participation in the preparation of the will. The district court found that Soukup and
Blanchard "selected the attorney to draft the will, drove
[testator] to the attorney's office, waited with him while
the will was drafted and executed, then drove him to the
Carver County courthouse where the will was deposited
with the clerk's office." The district court also found that
"it is a certainty that Blanchard and Soukup told [testator] what provisions to include in his October 17, 2001
will, and that Blanchard and Soukup read the October 17,
2001 will before it was deposited [*13] with the Carver
County Probate Court."
Undue influence may be proven by circumstantial
evidence. Estate of Olson, 176 Minn, at 365, 223 N. W. at
679. Here, Soukup was actively involved in every step of
the process of selecting the attorney and arranging the
meeting with testator, driving testator to the attorney's
office and waiting for him while the will was drafted and
executed, and driving testator to the courthouse to deposit the will. And Soukup was substantially benefited as
a beneficiary under the new October will. Based on its
observations of the witness and all of the circumstances,
the district court concluded that Soukup was actively
involved in the preparation of the will and its provisions.
On this record, the circumstantial evidence supports the
district court's finding by clear and convincing evidence.
C. Confidential Relationship

undue influence a "larger" share of testator's estate than
she would have received otherwise." Id.
Here, the record contains evidence that Hilk maintained, along with his family, a familial relationship with
testator; handled his financial affairs; did chores around
the farm; "looked out" for testator's well-being; was the
main beneficiary in each of testator's two prior wills; and
that the October will exhibited an entire, change from
former testamentary intentions in favor of Hilk to Soukup and Blanchard.
E. Singularity of the Will Provisions

Soukup argues the October will was not "singular"
because she was only one of three beneficiaries. Respondent argues that the October will was singular in eliminating him as a beneficiary. The district court found that
"[t]he provisions of the [will] are 'singular' because Hilk
is purportedly disinherited [*15] without being mentioned, and there is no mention of [testator]'s previously
expressed burial preference."
Singularity of the will provisions focuses on the nature and extent of the changes in the will from the testator's previous will. Here, the residuary beneficiary designation was the most significant change in the will, and
apart from the elimination of where testator desired to be
buried, was the "singular" change in the October will.
That provision replaced Hilk as a beneficiary with Soukup, Blanchard and Stoltman. On this record, it was not
clear error for the district court to find that the October
will provisions were "singular" in favor of Soukup and
Blanchard.
F. Exercise of Influence or Persuasion
to Induce the Testator to Act

Soukup concedes she had a confidential relationship
with testator because of her POA.
D. Disinheritance of Those Who
Probably Would Have Been Remembered

Soukup argues that this factor does not militate in
any particular direction because testator had a habit of
changing his beneficiaries. [*14] "But an entire change
from former testamentary intentions is a strong circumstance to support a charge of undue influence." In re Estate of Olson, 227 Minn. 289, 298, 35 N.W.2d 439, 446
(1948). "This is especially true where the effect of the
change is to give the beneficiary charged with exercising

Soukup argues that the district court failed to mention this factor in its "memorandum" and, therefore, that
its conclusion regarding undue influence was flawed. But
Soukup fails to provide any authority that such omission
is dispositive, particularly when this factor is discussed
extensively in the district court's order. Specifically, the
district court found that Soukup and Blanchard "exercised undue influence over [testator]. [*16] "
Here, the district court found that prior to the September 20, 2001 meeting, testator had agreed to spend
the winter at the nursing home. Testator stated to Olson
that he could not stay at the farmhouse that winter because it was a "hovel." Soukup and Blanchard were able
to exercise undue influence over testator at the meeting
by convincing him that Hilk "was holding John as a pns-

i. « 5 ^ u

2007 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 315, *

oner" at the nursing home, and that he intended to do the
same with him. Soukup admitted at trial that there was
no factual basis to conclude that Hilk was holding John a
"prisoner" at the nursing home. Based on Olson's testimony, the district court found that testator was "not himself and that Soukup and Blanchard "definitely have
him in control."
Soukup and Blanchard told testator that they would
have gas heat and telephone installed at the farmhouse so
that he could continue to live there, and that they would
bring him drinking water and food. ' The district court
found that they did so to make testator "dependent upon
them for his ability to continue to live at the Reichenberger farm."
1 Testator agreed to stay alone at the farm that
winter.
[*17] Subsequently, Soukup and Blanchard arranged a meeting with Koenig so that testator could execute a new will. Attorney Koenig met with testator, prepared the will, and had the will executed the same day.
Attorney Choi stated that he was not aware that Soukup
and Blanchard had taken testator to a different attorney
to prepare the October will. Two days after testator executed the October will, Soukup and Blanchard had a gas
heater and telephone installed at the farm.
On conflicting testimony, the district court made
credibility assessments which this court will not disturb
absent an abuse of discretion. See Tews v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 430 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Minn. 1988). And the
district court's finding that the October will was the
product of undue influence is supported by the findings
and clear and convincing evidence in the record.
Soukup also argues that the district court erred by
finding that the October will was void because it is a
self-proved will, the issue was not raised in the district
court, and the record contradicts the district court's finding. Hilk does not contest the argument. But because we
find that the October will was the product of undue influence, [*18] the question of whether it is void is moot.
II.
Soukup argues that the district court erred by granting testator's estate a judgment against Soukup and
Blanchard for attorney fees under Minn Stat. § 524.3720 (2006). Hilk argues that no fee petition was submitted by attorney Eric Dammeyer,2 no judgment for a specific amount of attorney fees was entered and, therefore,
there is nothing for this court to determine. The district

court's order regarding attorney fees is generally subject
to an abuse of discretion standard. Torgerson, 711
N.W.2d at 550. The court's findings will be set aside if
they are clearly erroneous. In re Estate of Balafas, 225
N.W.2d 539, 541 (Minn. 1975). However, where the decision is based on the court's application of a statute to
the uncontested facts, the construction and application of
the statute is a question of law, and is reviewed de novo.
Torgerson, 711 N. W.2dat 550.
2 Dammeyer represented Linda Soukup at the
district court.
[*19] Minn. Stat. § 524.3-720 provides in relevant
part:
Any personal representative or person
nominated as personal representative who
defends or prosecutes any proceeding in
good faith, whether successful or not, or
any interested person who successfully
opposes the allowance of a will, is entitled
to receive from the estate necessary expenses and disbursements including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred.

Absent a finding of bad faith, a personal representative
has a statutory right to recover attorney fees. Whether a
person is acting in bad faith is a question of fact. In re
Estate o/Evenson, 505 N.W.2d 90, 91 (Minn. App. 1993)
(reviewing district court's finding of good faith under the
clearly erroneous standard).
The only finding made by the district court on the
question of attorney fees provided: "Since Dammeyer's
representation was for the benefit of [testatorj's estate, he
is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees from the estate
and the estate is entitled to judgment against Linda Soukup, and Richard Blanchard in the amount of attorney's
fees awarded to Dammeyer."
But we have no underlying motion for attorney
[*20] fees outlining the nature and amount of the fees
requested, no finding of bad faith by Soukup, and no
legal basis for an award of attorney fees against nonparty Blanchard. Thus, we have no support in the record
for an award of attorney fees. Thus, we reverse the finding regarding attorney fees without prejudice to any
party.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Exhibit 2
Agreement Establishing the Ina C. Holman Trust dated July 27, 1990, Hearing
Exhibit 1.

AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE
INA C. HOLMAN FAMILY TRUST

THIS AGREEMENT is made this 3*1 r

day of July, 1990, by and

between INA C. HOLMAN, (hereinafter referred to as the "Trustor")
and

INA

C.

"Trustee").

HOLMAN

(hereinafter

sometimes

referred

to

as

the

This Agreement establishes the INA C. HOLMAN FAMILY

TRUST for the benefit of the Trustor and then her beneficiaries.

ARTICLE ONE
Property Transferred to the Trustees

The

Trustor

has

paid

over,

assigned,

granted,

conveyed,

transferred and delivered to the Trustee the property described in
Schedule "A, " which is, or will be attached hereto and made a part
hereof.

The

Trustee

hereby

agrees

to

hold,

administer,

and

distribute, in accordance with the provisions hereof, the property
described in said Schedule and any other property acceptable to the
Trustee which anyone may desire to add to the trust.

All property

initially or hereafter transferred to the trust, including property
passing to the trust by the Trustorfs Will, hereinafter sometimes
is termed the "Trust Estate."

ARTICLE TWO
Family Members

At the time of the execution of this Trust, the Trustor is a
widow and has four (4) children:

KATHLEEN ROBINSON, JENEVIEVE

OLSON, PHYLLIS HALL and ROBERT HOLMAN.

ARTICLE THREE
Provisions for the Trustor During Her Lifetime

The Trustee shall hold, manage, invest and reinvest the Trust
Estate for the exclusive benefit of the Trustor and shall collect
and distribute the income and principal as follows:
3.1

Distributions

Upon

Request,

During

the

Trustor's

lifetime, the Trustees shall pay to or apply for the benefit of the
Trustor as much of the net income and principal of the Trust Estate
as the Trustor may request from time to time.
3-2

Distributions

By the Trustee.

During

the

Trustor's

lifetime, the Trustee shall also pay to or apply for the benefit of
the Trustor such sums from the income and principal of the Trust
Estate as shall be necessary or advisable from time to time to
provide for her medical care, happiness, comfort and welfare.
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ARTICLE FOUR
Right Revoke or Amend the Trust

During her lifetime the Trustor may:

(1) revoke part or all

of this trust; (2) add other property to the Trust Estate; (3)
change the beneficiaries, their respective shares and the plan of
distribution; and

(4) amend this Trust Agreement in any other

respect.

ARTICLE FIVE
Trusteefs Discretionary Provisions

After the TrustorTs death, the Trustee, in the exercise of her
sole

and absolute discretion, may pay all or any part of the

Trustor's funeral expenses, legally enforceable claims against the
Trustor or her estate, reasonable expenses of administration of her
estate, any allowances by court order to those dependent upon the
Trustor, and any estate, inheritance, or similar taxes payable by
reason of the Trustor's death,

ARTICLE SIX
Ultimate Distribution of the Trust Estate

Following the Trustor's death, the Trust Estate shall be held,
administered and distributed as follows:

3

6.1

Division of Trust Estate.

The Trustee shall divide the

balance of the Trust Estate into equal shares and partial shares as
follows:

(a)

One full share for each then living child of the

Trustors; and (b) one full share for each group composed of the
then

living

Trustors,

lawful

to

be

descendants
apportioned

of each deceased child of the
in

partial

shares

among

such

descendants by right of representation.
6.2

Distributions of Trust Shares.

Any share or partial

share, as set forth above in Paragraph 6.1 above, set aside for a
beneficiary who predeceases the Trustor, such share or partial
share shall be distributed as set forth in this Paragraph 6.2.

The

Trustees may pay to or apply to the benefit of any such Beneficiary
such

sums

from

the

income

or

principal

of her

share

as

the

Trustees, in the exercise of the TrusteesT discretion, shall deem
necessary or desirable from time to time for the Beneficiary's
medical care, education, support and maintenance in reasonable
comfort, taking

into consideration, to the extent the Trustees

deems advisable, any other income or resources of such Beneficiary
known to the Trustees.

The Trustees shall annually add to the

principal of each share any undistributed income.
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6.3
division

Mandatory
into

Distribution

shares

pursuant

of Beneficiary
to

Paragraph

Shares.

6.1,

and

After
when

a

Beneficiary attains the age of Twenty-one (21) years, the Trustee
shall distribute to such Beneficiary all his or her share free of
this Trust.

If a Beneficiary has already attained the age of

Twenty-one (21) as set forth above at the txme the Trust Estate is
divided into shares pursuant to Paragraph 6.1, the Trustee shall
distribute

to

such

Beneficiary

all

of

his

or

her

share,

respectively, free of this Trust.

ARTICLE SEVEN
Appointment of Trustee

7.1

Appointment. Trustor hereby nominates and appoints INA C.

HOLMAN as Trustee of this Trust.
7.2

Appointment of Successor.
(a)

Upon the death, incapacity, resignation or discharge

of the initial Trustee, the following individuals shall serve as
Successor

Co-Trustees:

KATHLEEN

ROBINSON,

JENEVIEVE

OLSSON,

PHYLLIS HALL and ROBERT HOLMAN.
(b)

Any

Trustee

or Successor

instrument in writing.
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Trustee

may

resign

by

(c)

Any Successor Trustee shall have all the rights,

powers, duties, and discretion conferred or imposed on the original
Trustee,

No Successor Trustee shall be obliged to examine the

accounts and actions of any previous Trustee-

No Trustee shall be

liable for any act or omission unless the same be due to such
Trustee's own default.
(d)

Any Successor Trustee shall become responsible for

the Trust Estate only when the same shall be received by said
Trustee and shall only be responsible to make a reasonable inquiry
from the records of the prior Trustee which are available7.3

Bond and Accountings.

The Trustor specifically requests

and directs that no bond or other security shall be required of any
Trustee named hereunder. No Trustee hereunder shall be required to
file any court

accountings either during

administration

or at

termination of any Trust created hereunder.

ARTICLE EIGHT
Incapacity of the Trustor or Trustee

8.1

Determination of Incapacity-

The Trustor or any

Trustee shall be deemed incapacitated upon the following events
and upon the following evidences:
(a) A court order rendered by an appropriate court of the
place of the subject individual's then residence, holding said
individual to be legally incapacitated to act in her own behalf, or
appointing a conservator or other protective; or
6

(b)
disinterested

Duly

executed

licensed

written

physicians,

certificates

each

certifying

of

two

that

such

physician has examined said individual and concluded that by reason
of illness or physical or mental disability, he or she had, at the
date of said certificate, become incapacitated to act efficiently
or rationally and prudently in the management of property.
8.2

Deemed Release of Reserved Rights,

If the Trustor is deemed

incapacitated, she shall also be deemed to have released the rights
and privileges reserved under Article Four above, except that she
shall have the continued right of rent-free use and occupancy of
any residential real property plus the continued right to receive
as much of the Trust Estate

as may be appropriate to provide

generously for her comfort, support, maintenance, medical care and
happiness.
8.3

Termination

incapacitated,

of

Trusteeship.

such incapacity

If

shall

a

Trustee

cause her

is

deemed

trusteeship

to

terminate and to pass to the remaining or successor Trustee, who
shall have full and exclusive power to take any action permitted
the Trustee under this Trust Agreement.
8.4

Examination

into

Trustor T s

Possible

Incapacity.

No

Trustee (whether then acting or a designated successor) hereunder
shall be under any duty to institute

any examination into the

Trustor's possible incapacity, but any such examination reasonably
instituted by a Trustee

(excepting all conditionally

appointed

Trustees) shall be deemed made

at the Trustor's request, with

waiver

provisions

by

the

Trustor

of

all
7

of

law

relating

to

disclosure of confidential medical information needed in connection
therewith.

The expenses of any such inquiry may be paid from the

Trust Estate.
8.5

Objection

to

Physicians' Certification

of

Incapacity.

Should the Trustor, any Trustee or any adult Beneficiary object to
such physicians1 certifications, such objecting party may seek a
legal

determination

jurisdiction.

of

competency

in

any

court

of

proper

During the period of such certification, unless and

until a court of proper jurisdiction determines otherwise, any
attempt

by

the

Trustor

to

exercise

the

reserved

rights

and

privileges or to exercise the authority and power of a Trustee
shall be void and totally without effect.
8.6

Revocation

physician's

aforesaid

certificate

executed

of

Physicians1

Certification.

Any

one

certificate may be revoked by a similar
either

(1) by

the

originally

certifying

physician, or (2) by two other disinterested licensed physicians,
to

the

effect

that

the

Trustor

or

Trustee

is

no

longer

incapacitated.
8.7

Reassumption

of Reserved Rights and Trusteeship.

The

Trustor or Trustee shall be deemed to have reassumed the reserved
rights and the Trusteeship if the Trustee shall not at all times be
in possession of at least two unrevoked physiciansT certificates
and

the

particular

individual

is

not

then

conservatorship or other protective proceeding.
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subject

to

a

8.8

Disinterested Licensed Physician.

licensed

physician"

shall

mean

a

The term "disinterested

physician

certified

by

a

recognized medical board who is not a beneficiary hereunder, nor
related to the Trustor or any Trustee within the second degree, nor
related to any Beneficiary of this Trust or of the Trustor's Will
within the second degree.
ARTICLE NINE
Termination of Trust Estate
9.1

No Perpetual Trusts.

All Trusts hereunder shall in all

events terminate not later than twenty-one (21) years after the
death of the last survivor of the group composed of the Trustor and
those of her descendants living at her death (in the event these
trusts shall not have previously terminated in accordance with the
terms hereof).

The property held in trust shall then be discharged

of any trust, and shall immediately vest in and be distributed to
the persons then entitled to the income; for this purpose only it
shall be presumed:

(a) that any person then entitled to receive

any discretionary payments from the income or principal of any
particular trust is entitled to receive the full income; and (b)
that any class of persons so entitled is entitled to receive all
such property, to be divided among them by representation.
9.2

Discretionary

Termination

by

Trustee.

If

any

trust

hereunder has, in the Trustee's opinion, a fair market value of Ten
Thousand

Dollars

($10,000.00)

or

less,

the

Trustee,

in

the

Trustee's discretion, may terminate such trust and distribute the
9

entire remaining balance of the trust to the persons who are then
entitled to receive income payments in the proportions in which
they are at the time of term of termination entitled to receive the
income.

However, if the rights to income are not then fixed,

distribution may be made in equal shares to such persons as are
then authorized to receive income payments.

Such payments may be

made to a person regardless of the person's age, or to a person's
guardian, conservator, or custodian under the Uniform Gifts to
Minors Act.

ARTICLE TEN
Administrative Provisions

10.1

Broad Powers Granted to the Trustee.

The Trustee is

hereby vested with all of the powers now or hereafter conferred by
law and all of those powers detailed in the Utah version of the
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, which are incorporated herein by this
reference.

The trustee

is hereby vested

with

the power

and

authority to manage and control the Trust Estate in such manner as
the Trustee may deem advisable; and, she shall have, enjoy, and
exercise all powers and rights over and concerning the Trust Estate
in the proceeds thereof as fully and amply as though the Trustee
were the absolute owner of the same.
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10.2
asset

Establishing The TrusteeTs Authority.
of

the

Trust

Estate,

or

any

With respect to any

business

or

investment

transaction of the Trust Estate:
(a)
either

The assertion by any Trustee that she is acting

alone or with another as a qualified

Trustee shall be

sufficient on its face, and no person shall be put to further
inquiry into the right of such Trustee to so act.
(b)

No purchaser from or other person dealing with the

Trustee shall be responsible for the application of any purchase
money or thing of value paid or delivered to it, but the receipt of
the Trustee shall be a full discharge; and, no purchaser or other
person dealing with the Trustee and no issuer, or transfer agent,
or other agent of any issuer of any securities to which any dealing
with the Trustee should relate, shall be under any obligation to
ascertain or inquire into the power of the Trustee to purchase,
sell, exchange, transfer, mortgage, pledge, lease, distribute or
otherwise in any manner dispose of or deal with any security or any
other property held by the Trustee or comprised

in the Trust

Estate.
(c)

Title to the assets comprising the Trust Estate shall

vest in each successor Trustee by virtue of her appointment and
acceptance

without

any

further

instrument

of

conveyance

or

transfer. Each successor Trustee shall have all the administrative
rights, powers, discretions, obligations and immunities of the
originally named Trustee.
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(d)

The certificate of the Trustee that it is acting

according to the terms of the Trust Agreement shall fully protect
all persons dealing with the Trustee,
10.3

Payments to Persons Under Disability.

The Trustee, in the

Trustee's discretion, may make payments for the benefit of a minor
or other Beneficiary under disability by making payments to the
Beneficiary or by applying payments directly for the BeneficiaryTs
benefit.

The Trustee may make payments directly to a minor if, in

the Trustee T s judgment, the minor is of sufficient age and maturity
to spend the money properly.

The Trustee shall not be liable for

the misuse of any payments or applications so made.

Further, the

Trustee is authorized to reimburse the guardian, conservator, or
other

individual

with

whom

a

minor

Beneficiary

resides

for

reasonable expenses incurred in accommodating such Beneficiary to
the extent that distributions could then be made directly to or for
such Beneficiary.

This authority shall be liberally construed to

permit payments reasonably necessary to ease the financial burden
on

such

person

and

such

person's

family

resulting

from

the

accommodations of such Beneficiary.
10.4

Spendthrift Provisions.

Except as otherwise specifically

provided herein, no interest in the principal or income of the
trust shall be anticipated, assigned, encumbered, or subject to any
creditor's claim or to legal process prior to its actual receipt by
a Beneficiary.
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10.5

Division of Trust Property.

There need be no physical

segregation or division of the trusts created hereunder, except as
such segregation or division may be required by the express terms
of this Agreement or by the termination of

any of the trusts

created hereunder, but the Trustee shall keep separate accounts for
the different trusts. The Trustee may hold or invest the assets of
any of the trusts as undivided common interests.

In any case in

which the Trustee is required to set aside, divide, transfer, or
distribute any trust property, the Trustee is authorized, in the
Trustee's discretion, to make the set aside, division, transfer, or
distribution,

on a pro rata or non pro rata basis, in kind,

including undivided interests in any property, or partly in kind
and partly in money, at fair market valuations at the date or dates
set aside, division, transfer, or distribution.

For this purpose,

the Trustees may make such sales of trust property as the Trustee
deems necessary.
10.6

Apportionment of Taxes, (a) The amount of any estate,

inheritance, succession, death or similar taxes attributable to
property,

assets,

or

beneficial

interests

includible

in

the

Trustor's gross estate for Federal or state estate tax purposes
shall

be

apportioned

against

such

property

and

paid

by

the

beneficiaries, trustees, or recipients thereof.
(b) In making such tax apportionment, if any exception or
deduction allowed under law because of the relationship of any
person to the Trustor or the charitable gift, as the case may be,
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shall

be

exonerated

from

paying

any

portion

of

such

tax.

Furthermore, in making such tax apportionment, if any property
included in the Trustor's gross estate for tax purposes (that is
included

in

the

measure

of

the

tax) does

not

come

into the

possession or control of the Trustee, the Trustee is authorized to
recover the pro rata or incremental amount of the tax, as the case
may be, including interest and penalties attributable thereto, from
the

persons

benefitted,

in

accordance

with

the

applicable

provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and any applicable state
apportionment statutes.
10.7
In

any

Representation of Unknown and Undetermined Beneficiaries.
controversy

or

proceeding

involving

the

construction,

operations, or modification of this Trust Agreement, the then
living competent adult beneficiaries shall represent all minor,
incapacitated,

unknown,

and

undetermined

beneficiaries;

any

agreement reached or order, judgment or decree rendered in such
proceeding shall be binding upon all concerned, including those
thus represented.
10.8
Trustor

Applicable
while

Law.

residing

This
in

the

instrument
State

of

is executed by the
Utah

and

shall

be

interpreted and applied in accordance with the laws of the State of
Utah in force from time to time.
10.9

Severability.

If any provision hereof is unenforceable,

the remaining provisions nevertheless shall be carried into effect.

14

ARTICLE ELEVEN
Definitions

11.1

As used herein, the masculine, feminine, or neuter gender,

and the singular or plural number of tense, shall each be deemed to
include the others whenever the context so indicates.
11.2

As

used

herein,

the

terms

"children,"

"issue,"

or

"descendants" shall refer to lineal descendants of all degrees,
including adopted persons.
11.3

As used herein, the term "adopted" refers to both legally

and equitably adopted persons.
11.4

As used herein, the term "education11 shall be construed to

include vocational training, college, and postgraduate study, so
long as pursued to advantage by the Beneficiary, at an institution
of the Beneficiary's choice. In determining payments to be made for
such

training

or

education,

the

Trustee

shall

take

into

consideration the Beneficiary's related living and travel expenses
to the extent that they are reasonable.
11.5

If any beneficiary hereunder should die within six months

of the Trustor's death, or within six months of any other such
determinative date, he or she shall be deemed to have predeceased
the Trustor, etc., for all purposes under this Trust Agreement.
11.6

Whenever

a distribution

to

descendants

"by

right

of

representation" is called for by this Trust Agreement, the assets
subject to distribution are to be divided into as many equal shares
as there are then living descendants of the nearest degree of
15

living descendants plus deceased descendants of that same degree
who leave descendants then living; and each such living descendant
of the nearest degree shall receive one share, and the share of
each such deceased descendant of that same degree shall be divided
among his or her descendants in the same manner.

ARTICLE TWELVE
Execution and Acknowledgements

INA C. HOLMAN, the Trustor herein, hereby acknowledge:
That she has read the foregoing Trust Agreement;
That it correctly states the terms and conditions under which the
Trust

Estate

is to be held, managed,

and disposed of by

the

Trustee;
That this Trust Agreement is approved in all particulars; and
That this Trust Agreement is accepted and effected as of the day
and year first above written.

TRUSTOR AND TRUSTEE:

INA C. HOLMAN
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

^

)
: ss.
)

On the yT/ day of July, 1990, before me, the undersigned, a
Notary Public, personally appeared INA C. HOLMAN personally known
to me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be
the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and
acknowledged to me that she executed the same as Trustor and
Trustee.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my
official seal.

Notary Public
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INA C. HOLMAN FAMILY TRUST
Schedule A

Exhibit 3
Letter from Robert Holman to Ina C. Holman, undated, Hearing Exhibit 15.

Dear Mom:
I'm writing this letter on lotus so that I can do some calculations at
the same time* I'm going to illustrate two scenarios like I mentioned
in our phone conversation this morning- First of all let's agree on
some things that would be the same in each case. You indicated that at
-he present time your assetts looked something like this:
?ash and Condominium
,ake City 80 acres
'romissory Note ($80,000 face
$44,000 interest)
attle
ther Assets
Dtal Assets

$240,000
$160,000
$124,000
$35,000
$30,000
$589,000

: you died today my anticipation would be that each child would end up
.th one fifth or $117,800. Of course this would not be in cash but it
lould be one fifth of the value of the assets. I would want to trade
r
interest in the estate for the promissory note. That would leave the
tate looking like this:
sh and Condominium
ke City 80 acres
sh from Robert
ttle
ler Assets

$240,000
$160,000
$6,200
$35,000
$30,000

:al Assets

$471,200

($124,000-117,800)

r these assets are to be split 4 ways because I would be out of the
st. This would leave $117,800 each.
let's suppose I had paid the promissory note as agreed and had
n able to pay it off by now. Your estate should look something like
s now:
l and Condominium
3 City 80 acres
l from Robert
:le
>r Assets

$240,000
$160,000
$124,000
$35,000
$30,000

Payment of Note

$589,000
if you died under this scenario one fifth would be $117,800. I
strate this point, not to show that I was a good person not paying
*bts, but to show that the amount to be distributed between your
5 would have been the same. The decision to distribute like this is
i product of any current event, it is a decision that was made 5
; ago. I think that at the time you were thinking clearly and felt

will honor their parents decisions and not let it cause problems in my
family.
If this is not clear let me know.

Exhibit 4
Letter from Robert Holman to Ina C. Holman, dated October 21, 1994, Hearing
Exhibit 16

October 21, 1994

Enclosed is the item you requested. As per our phone conversation
this day, this deed is made to and delivered to the Grantee (Ina c.
Holman) with the understanding and the commitment from the Grantee
that she will:
1. Deliver to the Grantor (Robert J. Holman) the
Promissory Note marked "Paid" and,

$80,000

2. Remove from and not name Robert J. Holman in any wills or
trusts now made or to be made.
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